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An historical survey of certain
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education with particular attention
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The undersigned hereby certify that they have read and do recommend to the Committee on Graduate Studies for acceptance a dissertation on "An Historical Survey of Certain Concepts Basic to Progressive Education with Particular Attention to the Alberta Scene", submitted by Berthold Figur in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

AN HISTORICAL SURVEY OF CERTAIN CONCEPTS BASIC
TO PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION
WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE ALBERTA SCENE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

F A C U L T Y O F E D U C A T I O N

PY

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EDMONTON - ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER 1950



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FOREWORD

In this thesis it is proposed to trace the backgrounds and historical origins of certain aspects of the movement known as 'progressive education'. It has been presumed that the concept of activity---learning by doing ---is the most important component of the larger and more general idea. Thus the organization of material in this treatise centres around the concept of 'learning by doing'. The evolution of this particular idea is dealt with in Chapter III.

By 'activity' progressive educators mean activity of the whole organism. It includes overt doing as well as mental activity. Activities, it is believed, should arise out of the needs of the class as a unit, and out of the needs of the pupils as individuals. Knowledge-getting should be subordinate to development. The knowledge which is the most useful in solving a particular problem should be the most sought after. Thus books should be instrumental as sources of desired information and should not be used for memoriter learning.

Two other important aspects of progressive education, mind and change, are dealt with in Chapters I and II, respectively. They precede the chapter on 'Learning by Doing' in this thesis because the idea of learning by doing is largely an outgrowth of certain theories of mind and

change. For instance, modern educators look upon the learner as a complete organism. They do not view him as a combination of evil matter which leads him astray with its passions, and ethereal mind which requires special emphasis in the learning process. They believe that all aspects of the learner's being should be given due consideration---the physical, emotional and spiritual as well as the mental. The learner's emotions and drives are thought to be parts of his general make-up, and to need attention just as much as does the mental aspect.

The idea of perpetual change is no less a basic concept from which the idea of 'learning by doing' emanates. Advocates of progressive education generally agree that our world, and existence in that world, are precarious. The philosophy of change is accepted as being applicable not only to the external world, but to society as well. It is further believed that, because perpetual change allows us no permanency of knowledge, customs or verities, education should be characterized by activities which are designed to develop a personality that can readily readjust itself to the changing environment. By 'readjustment' progressive educators do not mean that the organism should merely make itself pliable to fit into this groove or that as conditions change. They think, rather, of an organism which, while fitting itself into the changing structure, also takes an active part and makes a positive effort to

modify the structure, so that it will fit the needs of the organism. There is thus a mutual modification.

So much for the material which precedes Chapter III. Chapter IV deals with education in a social milieu, which is a fourth basic concept inherent in the term 'progressive education'. It follows rather than precedes the chapter on 'Learning by Doing' (Chapter III) because, while the concept of 'education in a social environment' is an important aspect of progressive education, it is a concomitant of 'learning by doing' rather than a basic underlying concept on which activism is built. It follows rather than precedes the principle of activity.

Advocates of progressive education believe that modern society requires, more than ever, the co-operation of individuals to work out problems of common interest and common concern. They think that experience in social living should come early in the life of the individual. It is the school which can best provide the young person with the opportunity for taking part in wholesome social activities. Thus it is persistently urged, by progressive educators, that educational growth should take place within a social matrix.

Finally, special attention has been given to a particular educational scene. Chapter V traces the growth of activity education in Alberta. Thus Chapters I and II deal with the development of basically philosophical

concepts from which the principle of activity emanates; Chapter III traces the development of the most fundamental aspect of progressive education, education through activity; Chapter IV deals with a concept which has evolved alongside that of activity, and Chapter V gives a picture of the impact which the activity movement has had, and is having, upon Alberta schools.

CHAPTER I

MIND---SELF---REALITY

The Problem

The nature of the mind and its relation to the human organism is an important matter to the student of educational philosophy. If mind is primordial and is not related to the body in nature, the educative effort might well be centered on educating the mind. If the mind is unrelated to the body the material presented to the educand might well be of a type designed to train it as a special faculty---memoriter, sequential and logical. Book learning might be justified because, if the mind is a separate entity, sensation or bodily reaction would be quite unimportant in the educative process. There would be no need to stress 'learning by doing'. On the other hand, if the mind is only part of the entire organism and is closely related to the body, education should aim for all-round development since the mind would develop only in conjunction with the body.

There are still other aspects of mind that are of interest to the educator. For example, some philosophers ascribe to mind the power of motion, others the power of willing, and still others the power of creation---all in opposition to matter, which is thought to be passive, inert

and without thought. Mind, in this sense, is conceived of as a Supreme Mover of all things. Closely allied with this idea is the idea that Mind constitutes the Ultimate Reality---that God himself is Supreme Mind. It is even suggested that our minds are parts of a general Divine Mind and that this is the particular reason which makes us thinking beings and gives us our identity as 'selves'.

Early Theories of Mind

The earliest philosophers, the Milesians, Pythagoreans, Eleatics and Pluralists, were scientifically minded men. They sought to explain the existence of things mechanically rather than teleologically. They were more interested in physics than in metaphysics; hence they sought for a primary substance that would explain mechanically the world as we see it. Thales found the primary substance in water, Anaximander in a "boundless something", Anaximenes in air, Heraclitus in fire, the Pluralists in atoms, and so on. When we come to Anaxagoras, however, we find that he introduced an outside source of movement which he called Nous, or Mind. He considered the underlying reality behind the ordinary things of life to be 'seeds', which account for the great variety of objects the empirical world presents; but behind, and superseding all these objects is the moving principle, Nous, or rational mind. Nous alone is self-moved, and is the cause of motion in everything else. Anaxagoras, in this doctrine, sharply divides the rational life of mind from any intimate connection with the

rest of the world. He is the first philosopher to make such an explicit separation.

However sharp the separation of Nous from the rest of the world might be, the separation is not complete. Nous is not yet a spiritual substance; it is still a material agency. It is merely a refined type of matter---the thinnest of all things. It is different and of a higher order because it is unmixed with anything else. All other things are mixed; all the elements are diffused in nature. Everything is in everything else; the seeds, or constituents, are merely combined in varying proportions. Nous alone is pure, unmixed with anything else.

Leucippus, another Pluralist, had a similar idea of mind. He believed that Mind, or Soul, is only a particular kind of atomic matter. It is composed of fire atoms, which are the "smallest, smoothest, and most active of all"¹. The soul atoms exist everywhere, but they only produce sensation or consciousness when they come together in certain quantities as they do in the human organism. When they separate, as they do in death, consciousness disappears also.

Democritus, a follower of Leucippus, connected the mind with knowledge. He also believed that mind is composed of a particular kind of atoms, finer than the rest. He

1. Rogers, A.K., "A Student's History of Philosophy", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1937.) P.39.

thought that sensation is separate from mind, being caused by coarser atoms. Objects, according to him, shed copies or images of themselves. The images enter the sense organs which are fitted to receive them and by setting the soul atoms in action, give rise to perception. Sensation, however, is faulty, since the images become distorted in their journey through space. They are further distorted when they enter the sense organs as they do not fit exactly into the pores. Their shapes are thus altered.

Knowledge is not entirely reliable. There is such a thing as true thought. Such thought is conveyed to the soul by the finer atoms of the images, which copy the atomic structure of the objects. These images reach the soul more directly, not through the disturbing senses. The soul is diffused throughout the body---not merely localized in the senses---so the finer atoms of the images can reach it. Furthermore, the motion of the finer atoms is less violent so that less confusion results. The result is a clearer, more reliable idea of the thing perceived. Democritus' principle showed a definite tendency in the direction of mind supremacy, and of the subordination of sensation to thought.

With Plato we move into the realm of the abstract. He believed that mind is separate and distinct from the body. Moreover, he thought of a mind of spirit rather than of a

mind of matter. Mind, he believed, is superior to everything else; it is the higher faculty which is to rule and direct. Hence, of the three parts of soul---appetite, will and reason---reason is of the highest order. Sensation, desire and appetite are deprecated as being agents of disorder and not of wisdom and knowledge.

Closely allied with Plato's idea of mind and soul is his theory of 'Forms' or 'Ideas'. He thought that objects are only shadows of real things, and that the real things are 'Forms' which have a real existence apart from our world. The 'Forms' are not composed of matter; they are abstract, similar to the idea of mind. It is quite impossible to obtain knowledge through sensation, since objects have no real existence and sensations are faulty. The acquisition of true knowledge is a function of the mind. It is only mind that comes to recognize the universal character of things.

According to Plato, then mind is not only primordial but so disconnected from the world of ordinary things that we cannot hope to come in contact with it, or to get any true knowledge about it. The mind is concerned only with the contemplation of Forms. At once the question arises: How do the Forms get connected with particular objects? How can they give rise to motion, change and generation? Since man is interested in the things about him he naturally seeks answers to questions such as these. Consequently he

is prone to look for a closer relationship between mind and the material part of his being. Such a relationship Aristotle tried to establish.

Aristotle conceded a reality to form and matter. Both are interdependent, however; that is, form does not exist without matter and matter does not exist without form. Form is superior to matter since it implies actuality while matter is only potentiality.

Aristotle does not think of form as a mere inert pattern. It implies a process, an influence or inner urge towards actualization. It governs a series of particular changes. One might take the idea of 'tree', for example. The tree consists of many parts---roots, trunk, branches, leaves, and so on. These parts could be put together in any fashion. Form might be said to give it the particular shape. The idea of tree implies more than what the tree is at any one time, however. It is continually undergoing a series of changes, and these changes are part of the tree. The act of growing is the true end of the tree. Actualization is thus a process of life. The process does not exist outside the life of the tree itself. It is the form of the tree that governs the continual actualization. Form, in short, is a mover as well as a pattern. It does not exist separately from the material world. It is in that world and is closely united with it.

Aristotle finds it necessary, however, to include in

his system a supreme, pure and all-pervading force that moves all things. It is absolute, independent and unchanging, since it would not otherwise be a true Reality. The mover Aristotle has in mind is God. God is pure form, absolute mind whose life is that of pure thought---thought which thinks itself. He is unmoved himself but is the mover of the universe by virtue of his perfection. "He is the ideal towards which the whole of creation moves by an inner necessity."²

It is apparent, then, that Aristotle's dualism ends in the exaltation of mind as against matter. He makes his stand more explicit in his doctrine of soul. He believed, as Plato did, that the soul is multi-charactered, the characteristics being vegetative, appetitive and rational. Of these the rational is given precedence over the other two. Pure thought or contemplation is, according to Aristotle, the highest form of activity. Mind, while given a closer connection with the body than it was by Plato, is still pre-eminent. Matter exists to be sure, but it is subservient to mind.

Aristotle to Descartes

After Aristotle philosophic speculation comes almost to a standstill and for some time philosophy assumed an

2. Ibid., P.109.

intensely practical aspect. For one thing, it focused its attention on the individual and his needs rather than on his position as an organic member of a social order. Secondly, it gave its attention to the present life and not to a search for reality.

The Epicureans were concerned with the good life which to them meant the attainment of happiness. Epicurus believed that happiness comes with mental tranquillity or poise of mind. He did not think that mind is transcendental, however. "Where we are, death is not yet," he says, "and where death comes there we are not."³ This implies that minds are not eternal. Epicurus speaks of mind, though, as if it were superior to the body. Its satisfaction must be catered to first. Otherwise Epicurus upholds scientific inquiry and obedience to natural law through which, he believes, traditional dogmas will be broken down.

The Stoics also sought freedom from disturbing desires and from mental unease. To them, however, Socratic virtue, rather than pleasure, was the end of life. They looked also for a unity of things. The soul, they thought, was an organic whole. Matter and form exist together--- there is no such thing as pure form. As a matter of fact, even the forms are reduced to matter. Hence the Stoics have removed the last trace of transcendentalism. Matter

3. Ibid., P.134.

is the sole reality, but it is not dead. It is permeated by a living, rational principle, God, or Logos. Hence nature is fundamentally "a rational affair"⁴, and since man is part of nature, he is part of reality. Thus reason and matter have the closest unity possible.

When we come to the religious period, beginning about the third century, A.D., we find that, in general, dualism is in vogue. Mind is thought to be superior to matter; it is more akin to the divine spirit. "Matter is felt somehow to be evil, and the flesh is always and necessarily at war with the spirit."⁵ Plotinus, for example, is said to have been ashamed that he had a body. Feelings, emotions and everyday activities are looked upon as being unimportant. The soul is the real self; it is immortal and retains its consciousness after death.

Mind, according to Plotinus, is able to reach at least some knowledge of reality. The thought process is limited; it cannot attain full knowledge of the real, but the knowledge it does get is real knowledge. Both soul and mind represent various degrees of perfection. Neither of them is evil in nature while matter is the embodiment of evil. There is, of course, a rather close connection between body and mind since it is the body which disturbs

4. Fuller, B.A.G., "A History of Philosophy", (Henry Holt and Company, New York.) P.253.

5. Rogers, P.167.

the soul and turns the mind from its "true object to a preoccupation with particular things"⁶. Like Plato, Plotinus finds the highest good in the transcendent world.

Augustine, an early theologian, did not put much emphasis on mind. He emphasized 'will' as constituting the real nature of the self. Later he contended, however, that man had willed to go into corruption through the fall of Adam, and could not possibly escape damnation except within the universal church. This comes very close to a philosophy of determinism. Mind has thus little to offer man in his dilemma. Knowledge of the divine purpose might be gained from "revelation on the part of God"⁷.

Most of the philosophers of the middle ages had little to contribute the idea of mind. Roscellinus was a nominalist---one who holds that particulars are real. Anselm, a realist---one who believes that class terms or universals are real---contended that faith must precede knowledge; we believe that we may know. This was to become a basic point in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Abelard is regarded as the father of 'Conceptualism'---the theory that class terms have no objective existence but exist only as thoughts or conceptions in our minds. All these philosophers seem to have accepted the idea that mind has some sort of existence superior to matter.

6. Ibid., P.172

7. Fuller, P.355.

Aquinas based his philosophy on Aristotle rather than on Plato. He accepted Aristotle's concepts of matter and form and arranged all existence into a hierarchical system in which the lower is subordinated to the higher---body to soul, matter to spirit, philosophy to theology and the secular power to the ecclesiastical. Mind, he thought, is superior to the body, but there are heights to which reason cannot reach. The higher truths are communicated to us by revelation. We must accept them through faith. Revelation, then, is something superior to reason or mind.

The Rationalists---Descartes to Leibnitz

Before dealing with Descartes something might be said of Hobbes in connection with the transition to modern philosophy. He attributed all events to motion. Philosophy, to him, meant "the doctrine of the motion of bodies"⁸. It is the reasoned knowledge of effects from causes and of causes from effects. A mechanical explanation is given, not only to events in the natural world, but also to consciousness and mind. Consciousness, as everything else, is a form of motion---motion of the brain particles. Changes within the nervous system give rise to sensations, and a combination of sensations gives rise to consciousness.

8. Rogers, P.243.

Hobbes denied that objects have any objective reality. Concepts are mere counters or cue marks which the mind uses to reckon with. He also denied the reality of universals. He thus contradicted himself somewhat since he attributed a reality to mathematics which is very much connected with laws and concepts (universals). Furthermore, his idea of consciousness failed to show a satisfactory relationship between mind and matter.

Descartes, a dualist, attempted to find a connecting link between mind and matter. He thought he found such a link in the human organism. He began by stripping himself of all that he had formerly believed and attempted to build anew. He accepted only that which is absolutely certain. He explains:

I thought that the sciences contained in books, (such of them at least as are made up of probable reasonings, without demonstration), composed as they are of opinions of many different individuals massed together, are farther removed from the truth than the simple inferences of a man of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment draws respecting the matters of his experience.⁹

Thus Descartes indicates that he intends to build his philosophy upon reason.

Having stripped himself of all old beliefs, Descartes begins by establishing the existence of the self. He feels certain that the self exists because it can think. The existence of consciousness is undeniable. The nature of the

9. Descartes, Rene: "A Discourse on Method", Trans. by John Veitch, LL.D. (Everyman's Library - J.M. Dent & Sons, London), Pt.II, P.11.

self is thought. "I am, therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing," he says, "that is, a mind (*mens sine animus*), understanding, or reason---terms whose signification was before unknown to me."¹⁰ With knowledge of the self assured, Descartes goes on to prove his next point, the existence of God.

The proof for the existence of God is based on the principle of causality. Descartes contends that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the effect. Ordinary notions in the mind might arise from our own natures or from external compulsion, but the idea of God---a being which is omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, independent, immutable, and "wholly superior to all defects"¹¹---is too exalted and perfect to have arisen from any cause that falls short of the perception of the idea itself. Thus Descartes has little doubt that God exists.

The reality of matter cannot be doubted either since it can be clearly conceived, and God would not allow our conceptions to be faulty. Deception implies imperfection and imperfection cannot be attributed to God. While matter and mind are both real they are wholly diverse in nature, however. The nature of matter is extension while the nature of mind is thought. Descartes does not concede that we can

10. Ibid., P.88.

11. Ibid., Pt.III, P.95.

have knowledge of secondary qualities such as color. They are sensations and we cannot establish that they have a counterpart in the thing itself. Extension, however, is certain.

Having separated the two substances of mind and matter so widely, Descartes must find a way to bring them together again because mind and matter do seem to affect and react upon one another. The mutual reaction is particularly evident in the human organism and, according to Descartes, it is in the human organism that mind and matter come in closest contact. (Brutes, he thinks, have no rational mind; they are mere automatons.) In the human organism the seat of interaction between body and mind is a part of the brain known as the pineal gland. Here the fine particles of blood (animal spirits) enter into the various nerves and thereby determine the body to one action or another. Since this is also the seat of thought, the soul may deflect the fine blood particles into certain channels and withhold them from others. In this way the mind determines the actions of the body. Body and mind thus have a close relationship.

Descartes believed that the highest type of life is the intellectual life. The closest relationship between mind and body gives rise to other modes of consciousness, however, such as emotions, sensations, and the like. These are definitely of a lower order. It is apparent that

Descartes' dualism culminates in an idealistic monism--- the pure thought substance---God. All other modes of existence are dependent upon him.

Descartes had not offered a satisfactory theory connecting mind and matter. His followers, Guillinox and Malebranche, known as Occasionalists, attempted to bring the two substances closer together. They admitted the diversity in character of the two substances and did not attempt to bring them together by recourse to physical explanation. To explain the connection they fell back on the omnipotence of God. It is not the power of the human mind that effects an alteration in bodily movements, but a direct act of God. When the human mind wills a certain act God intervenes and changes the direction of the body. In this way there is no need of any influence passing between the two substances, mind and matter. This explanation was still unsatisfactory. A better one was offered by Spinoza.

Spinoza sought to correct the error inherent in the separation of mind and matter. He negated the reality of finite things and insisted upon the close connection of God with the world and of all things with one another. According to him, the idea that the world consists of a collection of independent persons and things, each complete in itself, is erroneous. One cannot understand an object if taken alone; one must take into consideration its

connection with all other things. We are thus led from one relationship to another in an endless series. No object has a permanent nature in isolation from other objects.

Spinoza brought all substances into a very intimate connection with God. Every fact that exists, according to him, must come under one of three heads: it is a substance, or an attribute, or a mode. A substance is "that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception"¹². An attribute is "that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance"¹³. A mode is a "modification of substance; or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself"¹⁴. The term 'mode' thus stands for all the facts that make up our world of external things and inner states of consciousness alike. Thus finite things are not merely explained by reference to God; they are God or, more specifically, modes of God. The mind of man is such a mode.

Since all things emanate from God, Spinoza believed that there can only be a logical dependence between objects, and no causality. Causality is only apparent. Only two

12. Spinoza, Benedict de, "Ethics", in "Spinoza's Chief Works", Trans. by R.H.M. Elwes, (George Bell and Sons, London, 1901) Vol.II, Pt.I, P.45.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

attributes of God are known to man---thought and extension. If a mode of extension (a physical fact) co-exists with a mode of thought (a fact of consciousness) we have what is apparent as causation. Actually there is only a parallelism.

There is no interaction between the thought and the extension series of modes, hence thought has no connection with physical facts. Spinoza even denied that the world was created in accordance with a plan or for a purpose. Since thought and physical facts do not interact, the physical world can only be explained mechanically. Things exist because of necessity. God cannot prevent things following from his nature.

Mind is thus a part of God's nature. It cannot obtain true knowledge of the phenomenal world, however. For one thing, there is a perpetual interaction between the body and other modes; knowledge is influenced by so many antecedent interactions that they can never be followed out. This invalidates knowledge of the physical world. Furthermore, interaction between the body and other modes gives rise to sensation which represents a state of our own body and not the true state of the object. The knowledge we get does not represent accurately either the state of the body or the state of the object. Thus empirical consciousness is inadequate thought.

Inadequate thought is further distorted by our emotions which are merely confused ideas. Opposed to

inadequate thought is adequate thought which exists in pure intellectual activity---reason. In reason man frees himself from emotions and passions and draws towards eternal unity. Spinoza's concept is quite fatalistic. Things merely emanate from God. Neither God nor man can control the process. Mind can only contemplate; it has no control over matter.

Leibnitz was not satisfied with Spinoza's explanation. It left no room for the genuine reality of things---men and objects, and for teleology or purpose which Leibnitz considered to be the essence of life. Leibnitz also looked for a closer unity of things than that offered by Descartes' explanation. He thought he had found the answer in the theory of monadology.

According to Leibnitz mind and matter do not have separate and widely distinct characteristics such as thought and extension. The essence of both mind and matter is force. Matter is not something that is extended, but something that is capable of action. The same is true of mind. The basic nature of both is similar.

Reality, Leibnitz contends, consists of a host of unextended centres of force, which Leibnitz called "monads". Each monad is complete in itself. All monads are alike in so far as they are "reals", but each represents a different grade of development. The inner nature of the monads is described in terms of force. "Each has some motion of its

own."¹⁵ Force is considered as being synonymous with thought. The monads represent different levels of thought. At the bottom there are monads whose thought life is so confused that it is more akin to a dreamless sleep. These monads constitute what is known as matter. The monads on the higher scale constitute souls. Leibnitz contends that the different degrees of consciousness of the monads find their counterpart in man. He too experiences different levels of consciousness. There is a level below clear consciousness which is more or less obscure. Leibnitz calls them "unconscious mental states" or "petites perceptions"¹⁶. The different levels of thought shade into one another. There are no abrupt divisions.

Each monad is not only a complete entity and a separate centre of force but it has the principle of its "life and development contained wholly within its own nature"¹⁷. The monads do not cause one another to act in a certain way, and no monad acts in response to another monad. The action and development of each is limited to the possibilities of its own nature. There is a unifying principle, however, which leads the monads to act in a certain order. This principle is 'Pre-established Harmony'.

Pre-established harmony, as the words imply, is a pre-determined unity of purpose among monads. It is true

15. Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm: "New Essays in Monadology", Trans. by Robert Latta, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1898) P.256.

16. Ibid., P.371.

17. Rogers, P.311.

that each monad lives an independent life, absolutely uninfluenced by any other monad. However they do operate towards a common purpose and according to a common plan. This unity of purpose has its source in the mind of God, the highest of all monads. Each monad is constituted at the beginning to operate within a universal plan. Thus by simply following its own activity each monad contributes to the whole.

What, then, is the real relationship between mind and body? Leibnitz explains that what we call the body is not actually a material thing but consists of a group of monads of the less developed sort. The soul is a higher monad. Each such higher monad has a group of "inferior associates with which it stands in a specifically close relation"¹⁸. The lower monads tend to subordinate themselves to the higher monad, and thus we have what phenomenally is a body. The soul, or mind, actually does not govern the body. The soul and body (a host of monads) have all been shaped to function in unison so there is no disunion.

Before leaving Leibnitz a few words about his theory of knowledge will be in order. They are given to us in his "New Essays on the Human Understanding", which were written purposely to examine Locke's theory of knowledge. Leibnitz refutes Locke's theory of tabula rasa.

18. Ibid., P.313.

He concedes that in point of time sensations do come first, but he believes that universal knowledge exists implicitly and that it is involved in the sensations themselves. His doctrine of 'petites perceptions' comes to his aid. It enables him to understand how ideas may be in the mind in an undeveloped way, and yet leave us unconscious of them. According to Leibnitz universal ideas must be present in one form or in another, or they would not exist at all. Universal truths can never come from sensations. Sensations can only give us particular truths---the shape of an object, its color, and so forth. In order to get true knowledge the mind must play its part.

Leibnitz' conception of mind is thus quite different from that of Locke. To Locke mind was a recipient and manipulative thing, and rather passive in nature. In the absorption of knowledge its reaction is of no importance. To Leibnitz the reaction of the mind is the essential thing. It is through the activity of mind that confused ideas are cleared up. Without the activity of mind there would be no reality. In sensations the mind is active and the activity is disposed to a specific outcome. Leibnitz' idea of mind, then, corresponds with his idea of monads; it is a centre of force.

The Empiricists---Locke, Berkeley, Hume

With Locke the theory of mind assumes new characteristics. He is interested more in the growth of ideas than in the nature of mind. He assumes largely that mind is a machine which perceives and manipulates ideas. The origin of mind or its relationship to matter seem to be of secondary concern to him. It is the function of mind which interests him most.

Locke begins by arguing the existence of innate ideas out of the way. His favorite argument runs as follows: Universal ideas are generally assumed to have the universal assent of mankind. Children and idiots, however, are not aware of them. Now for something to be imprinted upon the mind, and for the mind not to be aware of it seems most paradoxical. As Locke puts it,

For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it seems hardly intelligible.....That truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is for me as unintelligible as for man to know the truth and yet be ignorant of it at the same time.¹⁹

Having put innate ideas out of the way, Locke goes on to explain the growth of our whole stock of ideas. Knowledge, Locke contends, is derived from experience. Experience is divided into 'Sensation' and 'Reflection'. Sensation is the source of our knowledge of external objects,

19. Locke, John: "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Collated and Annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser, (Clarendon Press, Oxford) Vol.I, Bk.I, Chap.I. P.58.

while Reflection gives rise to ideas through the operation of our own minds. The mind is thought to be a *tabula rasa* at birth. It is fitted to receive impressions made upon it either through the senses by outer objects or by its own operations when it reflects upon them. Ideas may be put together by the mind in various ways, but all the original ideas must have their source in the senses.

Locke then goes on to explain how ideas grow mechanically out of experience. He begins with "Simple" ideas (those which come to us through sensation), moves on to "Complex" ideas (combinations of Simple ideas resulting from reflection), and finally goes on to sub-divide Simple and Complex ideas into various types and categories. By a continuous manipulation our whole storehouse of ideas comes into existence. Locke defends his argument thus:

It will not be strange to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, or largest capacity; if we consider how many words may be made of the various composition of twenty-four letters; or if we will but reflect on the variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, viz., number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite.²⁰

So much for the source of our ideas. Locke next takes it upon himself to establish the validity of our ideas, that is, what do the ideas tell us in the way of truth?

20. Ibid., Vol.I, Bk.II, Chap.VII, P.164.

Why does Locke accept the principle of causation, for example? Locke divides knowledge into three kinds, intuitive knowledge, demonstrative knowledge, and sensual knowledge. The three kinds of knowledge correspond with the three kinds of substances about which we have knowledge. Intuition is perception so plain and clear that we need no further proof. We have knowledge of our own existence by intuition, for example. We have knowledge of the existence of God by demonstration. Sensation gives us knowledge of material things.

Locke does not contend that our ideas of material things are necessarily true in every way. They are valuable in a practical sense, however. Here Locke introduces a new idea. Man's actions, he thinks, cannot depend on the certainty of knowledge. They must often be based on probable knowledge. The knowledge that we have, although perhaps not altogether valid, is good enough to guide us in our every day actions, and for more we should not ask.

He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him, he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit and perish.²¹

So the mind has become a guide to action. It does not matter if what we know is not altogether adequate. If our knowledge is sufficient to direct us in our every day undertakings it is good enough. Locke has thus germinated an

21. Ibid., Vol.II, Bk.IV, Chap.XIV, P.360.

idea which later receives more emphasis in the philosophy of Instrumentalism.

Locke had considered mind to be a tabula rasa or a machine where primary impressions are received, mingled, fused, blended and combined into more complex ideas. With Berkeley the theory changes again. He considered mind to be a perceiving (conscious) thing rather than a mere receptacle or register. Berkeley negates the existence of unthinking matter. To him the essence of reality is perception. Nothing exists apart from being perceived. Not only thoughts but passions and emotions also exist within the mind. Matter, too, is nothing but the things we experience.

Experience is thus established as the basis of knowledge. Our ideas are not dependent on our will, however, that is, we cannot will to perceive or to exclude from our perceptions any objects. There are two characteristics of sense experience over which we have no control---its inevitableness and orderly coherence. Berkeley writes, "When in broad daylight I open my eyes it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view."²²

Not all of reality, however, exists as idea only. We may know ourselves, or spirits. A spirit is a substance,

22. Berkeley, George: "Treatise Concerning Human Understanding", in Burt: "The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, (The Modern Library, New York). P.532.

something active, something which perceives. An idea is a passive thing. To quote Berkeley again:

All unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive and that their existence consists only in being perceived, whereas a soul is an active being whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and in thinking.²³

Of the spirit substances we have not ideas but notions.

It would appear that if things are only ideas they are very largely subjective. Furthermore, we should be able to form a world suitable to our own tastes. Berkeley does not support that view at all. On the contrary, he argues for the objectivity of our ideas. The order of our ideas, according to him, is determined by a power beyond ourselves. Hence, what we know as the laws of nature are merely the connection of our ideas. For instance, by reference to one sensation we may know what sensations are about to follow.

The connection of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it.²⁴

Thus sensations merely give us foresight by which we can govern our actions. They serve a practical purpose. Here

23. Ibid., P.572.

24. Ibid., P.545.

Berkeley has something in common with Locke. He, too, believed that much of our knowledge serves a worthy purpose if it is practical.

Berkeley, then, closes the gap between matter and mind simply by getting rid of matter. Reality, or the basis of existence, according to him, is perception. Matter does not perceive so it does not exist. Berkeley's philosophy is a philosophy of immaterialism. Mind is given pre-eminence over matter. Its basic function is perception. It has an active function in the production of ideas. It is thus opposed to the type of mind Locke thought of---a passive, receptive, and manipulative faculty.

Hume concluded the line of thought which began with Locke and grew with Berkeley. He, too, gave pre-eminence to sensation and came to the final conclusion that the world is a world of ideas, and not of real things. Even the principle of causation is denied.

Like Berkeley, he tried to explain the operation of the mind and the getting of knowledge rather than the substance of mind. He explained that all knowledge falls into two categories: it is either an impression or an idea, that is, if we reduce it to its utmost simplicity, a product of feeling (impression), or a product of thought (idea).

The difference betwixt these consists in the degree of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into

our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with the most force and violence, we may name impressions" Ideas are "the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning .²⁵

Thought does not begin without impressions.

Since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions.²⁶

Hume thus argues away the existence of material substances.

Reality, he believes, co-exists with ideas. Hume explains:

We have, therefore, no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it....The idea of substance is nothing but a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned to them.²⁷

Not only does Hume deny the existence of a material substance, but of a spiritual substance as well. Even the 'self' is non-existent except in so far as it is able to perceive. He says, "When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound or sleep, so long I am insensible of MYSELF, and may truly be said not to exist."²⁸ Having established himself as a perceiving thing he conceives of the rest of mankind as a host of perceptions. We experience these perceptions in rapid succession. "The mind is a kind

25. Hume, David: "A Treatise of Human Understanding", (Everyman's Library, J.M.Dent & Sons,Ltd.,London--E.P.Dutton & Co.Inc., New York, 1949) Vol.I, Bk.I, Pt.I, Sec.I, P.11

26. Ibid., Vol.I, Bk.I, Pt.II, Sec.VI, P.71.

27. Ibid., Vol.I, Bk.I, Pt.I, Sec.VI, P.24.

28. Ibid., Vol.I, Bk.I, Pt.IV, Sec.VI, P.239.

of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, and re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations."²⁹

Mind, then, is a perceptive thing; that is all we can know about it. Its substance is unknowable. We can know how it operates, however, and Hume goes on to show how the idea of causation has come to be accepted as "knowledge". The idea, he explains, is merely derived from a certain definite relationship between objects. That relation is contiguity, succession, and necessary connection. The idea of causation has become 'belief'. Hume does not think that belief can be destroyed. He only attempts to show that its validity is not demonstrable. We cannot help believing even though we cannot prove our ideas. Our ideas are formed from our original impressions. Our knowledge, therefore, is necessarily subjective.

The Idealists---Kant---Schopenhauer---Hegel

"Hume had dissolved the world into a host of unrelated feelings, or sensations, which, summed together, compose the human mind."³⁰ (Rogers) His theory implied that a person's knowledge is entirely shut up within himself; that there is no reality other than feeling or sensation. Moreover, the mind thus conceived is a mere perceptive or

29. Ibid.

30. Rogers, P.377

cognitive faculty. It merely registers sensations.

Kant set himself the task of developing a theory that shows the mind to be, not a mere register of sensations, but a synthesizer, a constitutive faculty, and a framework within which ideas naturally take their place. Sensations, Kant thought, are not isolated; somehow they get related. As they become interconnected they present an orderly whole, thus producing a unified consciousness. The sum of the sensations present in the mind becomes more than the sum through the synthetic activity of the mind. The synthesis of two or more impressions does not merely present a state of unified consciousness, but results in the development of ideas, which are not simply impressions or sensations, but more fully developed and mature concepts.

According to Kant, knowledge is only possible if we "presuppose a certain framework of thought relationship over and above the sense content to which Hume had reduced knowledge".³¹ In other words, we may conceive of mind, from one point of view, as a framework within which knowledge must fit. Hume, for example, had denied the reality of such notions as causation and space. Kant would say that they are a priori categories of the mind, and that knowledge must conform to such notions. They are a priori notions because they are absolutely independent of all experience.

31. Ibid., P.378.

Finally, the mind is an agent in the formation of knowledge, that is, it has a constitutive function. Commonly the mind was thought to be a faculty which registers images or copies of the objects of knowledge. Kant saw a certain relationship between impressions and theorized that the establishment of such relationships is a function of the mind. The knowledge we obtain of the world, then, is very much a product of thought. To go to Kant himself:

It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition.³²

The mind, then, does not merely perceive things but helps to shape them.

Kant concedes that experience has a place in the acquisition of knowledge.

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.....In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.....But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion),

32. Kant, Immanuel: "Critique of Pure Reason - Preface to Second Edition", Trans. by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, in "A Library of Universal Literature, (P.F. Collier and Son, New York), Pt.I, VolI, P.26.

an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight---whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions. Knowing of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.³³

Kant's theory of mind and of the necessity of experience in the acquisition of knowledge is one which puts the human being in closer contact with the world of things than it had been since the time of Descartes. Empiricism, postulating that sense impressions are requisite to knowledge, finally reached a point (in Hume) where the human being was put altogether out of contact with the objective world, and where his own subjective impressions constituted his only knowledge of the outside world. Kant may be given the credit for making at least a good start in bringing man into closer contact with the world of objects.

Kant had been concerned with the 'synthetic' function of the mind. He believed that he had found an essential relationship between 'ideas', a relationship which the mind formulates. There was one thing which he did not bring into a relationship or unity, and that was the categories. They were still isolated. The idea of unity was given more stress by Hegel.

33. Ibid., Introduction, P.43.

Hegel saw the "world as a progressive embodiment of reason".³⁴ The ultimate reality, according to him, is a system of Thought or Reason -- a "system of relationship in which all things move and have their being and their significance".³⁵ Partial facts are only abstractions; they need to be brought into connection with the whole in order to gain validity. If the particular is real only in relation to the whole it follows that human thought is real only in relation to the Ultimate Thought, that is, human thought is part of a system of thought. In this system all 'forms' and 'categories' (thought forms) such as 'quantity', 'quality', 'substance', 'causality', 'essence', 'existence', and the like, belong to a connected system, unified in a supreme category of 'self-consciousness'. They culminate in a complete notion which includes them all. Man's thought operates, therefore, in accordance with eternal laws. It is not subjective.

The Ultimate Reason becomes externalized in nature and in the objective world. In nature the Reason advances systematically until it attains its highest form in the human body---a conscious creature. This is indeed a high level of attainment in the process of self-realization; it is the attainment of a degree of Reason itself. Nature

34. Rogers, P.406.

35. Durant, Will: "The Story of Philosophy", (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1928), Chap.VI, P.323.

is the medium through which Reason expresses itself; it is the natural environment that furnishes the plastic material for the Spirit's self-expression. Man is a part of nature---an object among others---different only in the degree that he represents in the development of the Real.

As the Ultimate Reason requires a medium through which to express itself, so also does man, who constitutes a lower form of reality. Man's activity and effort in the objective world is in accordance with the laws of Reason. The external things he manipulates are expressive of his reason, and also of the Ultimate Reason, since both are part of a system. Man, however, expresses himself most truly in his social life; in the creation of social institutions.

The external world, then, is not entirely unreal. It is part of the Real, and represents a certain stage in the development of the Real. There is no clear-cut division between mind and matter as had been supposed by philosophers preceding Hegel. Kant had made a start in the unifying of concepts; Hegel carried it much farther. The idea of a complete unity of experience as being expressive of development, and of the external world as having at least some measure of reality anticipate, to a degree, the viewpoints of such men as Froebel, Darwin and Dewey.

Brief treatment will be given to Herbart in this chapter as his contribution is again dealt with in Chapter III. Herbart believed, like Leibnitz, that reality is composed of numbers of reals. The soul is one real among many. Interaction of the soul with other reals gives rise to ideas. The sum total of our ideas is known as the "apperceptive mass".

Consciousness is flowing, according to Herbart. Ideas in the apperceptive mass continually try to dominate over one another. Our ideas thus exist in various degrees of vividness. Herbart believes that the flow of consciousness is subject to regulation. Regulation can be effected by controlling the reals which come in contact with the soul. Although mind is considered to be a complete entity in itself it does not function without interaction. Experience is necessary.

Schopenhauer reverts to the idea that the world is a mere appearance. What we know "is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth".³⁶ The world that surrounds us is only there as an idea. Schopenhauer thinks that there is a reality behind our experience, however. That reality is Will.

36. Schopenhauer, Arthur: "The World as Will and Idea", Trans. by Haldane and Kemp, (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., London), Vol.I, P.1.

We cannot know or reach this reality by the pathway of reason, nor can we learn to know it empirically. We can only know it by intuition. Here Schopenhauer's idea of thought and mind is interesting. He puts intuition above thought. We only sense the existence of a reality; we cannot establish its existence through reason or demonstration. Thought is subservient to Will; we think in order to do. The mind is just a tool which aids the will in its omnipresent, all-pervading activity. "It is the blind man carrying on his shoulders the lame man who can see."³⁷ In itself Will is blind and irrational, but thus the intellect has emerged in higher creatures to guide its activity.

Schopenhauer has thus developed an idea of mind which is closely akin to that of the evolutionists. Mind has come into existence because of necessity. It is not primordial but is a product of growth. Mind has emerged because without it the activity of Will would become more and more difficult, and more and more aimless.

As a tool to regulate one's life, mind can only be used to contemplate ideas. Only thus can man find a momentary release from the ever present urge to strive onward. It is only a partial release, however; man can never free himself from Will completely. Will always dominates because intelligence exists only in relation to

37. Rogers, P.428.

Will. Will is all-pervasive; intelligence is only a surface phenomenon.

More Recent Tendencies

Darwin's theory of evolution is covered in Chapter II, in connection with the philosophy of change. It will be drawn in here only in so far as it affects the subject under consideration, namely, mind.

Darwin's concept of evolutionary development implied a strictly mechanical process. There is no ultimate mind directing it. Mind, itself, is a product of evolution. Since there is no ultimate mind, we cannot assume that the human mind originates from, or is endowed with, any primal qualities. It arose out of, and as part of, the organic development of the species. There is a gradation among objects in the organic world. On the lower scale organisms are almost indistinguishable from inorganic things. Similarly, there is a region in the organic sphere where consciousness exists in a very low degree. Intelligence reaches its highest state in man, who is merely the most developed object in the process of evolution. Intelligence developed with the organism. As man became more and more intelligent he became more and more capable to cope with the hardships hindering his existence. Consequently, he came out on top of the scale. Like everything else, the mind has originated for some purpose other than itself; it

is an instrument rather than an end. A similar view of intellect had already appeared in Schopenhauer, where thought is secondary to the Will to live. In Darwin mind develops with the development of the organism.

As naturalism gained more and more followers, philosophers, who, though actually idealists, tried to combine the two realms of matter and mind into a unified system. The attempts are reminiscent of those made by Spinoza and Leibnitz. Lotze, for example, accepted the mechanical explanation in the field of science, but subordinated it to an ultimate idealism. Ultimately, he thought, reality is monistic.

Fechner also believed that the universe forms a closed system. He granted a reality to both the physical and the psychical processes, but contended that they operate alongside one another. This doctrine is known as psycho-physical parallelism.

According to Fechner it is only our conscious life that we know. We don't see ourselves as material facts. Only an outside observer sees us as a physical body. The same is true of all objects, animals, plants and inanimate things. We see them as material substances, but they all have conscious lives like our own, only less complex. All these minor consciousnesses have their unity in one great Conscious Being---God. God embraces the unity of scientific law.

Green, an English philosopher, had beliefs similar to those of Kant. Mind, he held, cannot be explained by nature. There must be a presupposition of spiritual principle, the unity of self-consciousness. The world is real for knowledge only; there must be something which constitutes the world, and that something cannot be a passive product of this world. Knowledge, for example, is knowledge in time. We can know a series of events only as a series. The facts must be held together by something which is out of time. Such a timeless principle cannot be a product of change, and hence, not a natural product. It is a unity of self-consciousness, not of the human self, but a Universal Consciousness---God. This consciousness makes possible the very thinking of the world of science as a connected whole. Human selves are connected with the eternal self. In knowledge-getting man takes part in the actual life of God.

Another philosopher who supported the idea of a Universal Consciousness was Josiah Royce, an American. He believed that reality is knowable only as an ultimate, all-inclusive consciousness, or Self. Human selves enter into it to supply a content.

Henri Bergson, a French philosopher, strongly upheld the view that thought has only instrumental value, and that it is inadequate for speculation. Bergson finds reality in a "vital impulse", or a spontaneous living force, which is

closely akin to consciousness. "It is a force which can draw from itself more than it contains, yield more than it receives, give more than it has."³⁸ It is from this impulse that the active and creative process of the world springs. This vital impulse underlies the ceaseless change which we continually experience. Bergson, recognizing this continual change, looks to experience for a knowledge of reality. We have a tendency to break up knowledge into separate bits of conscious fact, he thinks, but actually the facts merge into one another. Consciousness is thus a flow; not a state.

Matter is opposed to the vital impulse because it is passive and inert, and because its limit is pure space.

It never attains this limit, however. It is not to be identified with particular material objects; the division of matter into separate bodies is the work of our senses. It is a general principle which conditions everywhere the pure activity of consciousness, and out of which arise the concrete possibilities of experience as we know it.³⁹

Thought, Bergson believes, is not an instrument for knowing reality. It is a tool which the creative force has created to serve practical needs (an idea similar to Schopenhauer's). It is a light lighting up the path which human beings follow, lighting up, not the world, but the "narrow passage open to their action".⁴⁰ Knowledge is

38. Bergson, Henri: "Mind - Energy", Trans. by H. Wildon Carr, (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920.) Chap.I, P.39.

39. Rogers, P.472.

40. Ibid., P.473.

not continuous; we focus our attention on particular things or aspects. Our attention is governed by a "practical interest, which ignores such aspects of reality as do not cast light on the present situation and its needs".⁴¹

Knowledge is likened to a cinema. The film is made up of a series of pictures which presents a reality that is continuous. If the reality is split up into discontinuous parts it cannot explain the original flow of life, it cannot present its original meaning. In practice we focus our attention on the particular facts. We operate as though "the present contains no more than the past; the effect contains no more than the cause".⁴² For practical purposes this is justifiable. We cannot recreate the real process, but we can replace it with a practical equivalent.

We resolve the new and unforeseeable into old and familiar elements, arranged in a different order, and so we are led to a notion of a system of stable mechanical relationships which postulates the totality of the real as complete in eternity, the apparent duration of things expressing merely the infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at once.⁴³

This involves a falsification of the real, but it does make life more intelligible. In the lower forms of life---the vegetative, for example, or the animal life of instinct---the creative force often blunders and leads the organism into blind alleys. In man, who in a sense is the end of creation, intelligence is most highly developed.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., P.474.

43. Ibid.

He can set before himself alternatives of action, and thus guide himself along life's uncertain road. As Bergson puts it, "the brain is an organ of choice".⁴⁴

For James, too, thought is a tool for action. He, too, saw consciousness as flowing, and used the term "stream of consciousness" to describe the nature of mental activity. Out of the stream of particular elements are selected the needs of organic life. Mind is not concerned with reaching ultimate truth, but operates in relation to the needs of the animal or physical organism.

If thought does not exist for the purpose of grasping the nature of the ultimate, it does make a "practical difference".⁴⁵ Man's activity cannot be regulated entirely by scientific laws. Science disregards many of man's needs and instincts which have a claim to satisfaction. While we do not have the right to believe anything we like there are instances where a choice must be made and where decisive evidence is lacking. To withhold a decision may mean to lose, so that taking a risk of being wrong does not actually put us in a worse condition. We may thus follow our beliefs and choose whichever alternative our minds direct. There is an element of risk in this attitude, but James thinks that risks are not to be shunned. Adventures and readiness to take chances are properly a part of life.

44. Bergson, Chap.I, P.13.

45. James, William: "Pragmatism" (Longmans, Green and Co., New York - London, 1922.) Lecture II, P.45.

Dewey accepts, and enlarges upon, James' pragmatic views. He begins by identifying 'thought', 'reality' and 'life' with experience. Thought is "thinking", that is, it is associated with activity. Dewey thinks of experience, not merely as the experience of any particular individual, but of Experience, the general concept. His concept of experience parallels the concept of the on-going process of life and of the world, the flux, the changeability and the development of which previous philosophers had spoken. Within this experience things and selves make their appearance and their exits. Thinking occurs within experience; it helps to make living more intelligible. We do not think merely for the sake of thinking as Aristotle, for example, suggested. The best life is that of activity---creative activity---and not the life of contemplation. As a guide to activity, however, thinking makes a difference.

Mind, according to Dewey, has evolved; it is the product of experience. It is not something that has been handed down to us from above to make experience rational. Thinking is something that happens to experience.

So long as life moves slowly we do not think---we act. It is only when the impulses that normally lead to action conflict with one another, and the issue becomes confused and doubtful, that we have to call a halt to the immediate business of living and turn our attention instead to the means of reconstructing our interrupted activity. This last is what constitutes the special phase of experience we call thinking.⁴⁶

46. Rogers, P.478.

Thinking is thus employed in an experimental sense to liberate and liberalize actions. "All our experiences have a phase of cut and try in them."⁴⁷ It is the business of mind to "refer present conditions to future results, and future consequence to present conditions",⁴⁸ in other words, to make living more intelligible.

Summary

The substance of this chapter indicates a gradual evolution of an organismic theory of reality. Plato introduced the concept of a spiritual substance into philosophy, and with it the problem of establishing the true relationship between the two substances, mind and matter. Aristotle, Descartes and Aquinas offered arguments in support of dualism. Their explanations left the relationship between mind and matter too loose, however. The rationalists, Spinoza and Leibnitz, attempted to bring the two substances closer together by identifying both with the Ultimate Reality, God. According to them there is the closest relationship between what we know as mind and matter.

The empiricists, Berkeley and Hume, tried to explain that reality is unknowable and that, what we know as phenomena,

47. Dewey, James: "Democracy and Education", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1920) Chap. XI, P.169.

48. Ibid., Chap.VIII, P.120.

are actually only our ideas. Kant came to the rescue and brought the external world back to reality. He insisted, however, that objective knowledge is largely a product of mental activity. Hegel moved closer to monistic idealism and identified the external world with the Ultimate Reason. His monistic idealism was later countered by theories of monistic materialism, advanced by such men as Darwin and Spencer.

After the evolutionists both idealistic and materialistic philosophers generally tried to combine the two substances of mind and matter in a unified oneness. Lotze, Fechner, Green and Royce made such attempts. The growth of the idea of 'oneness' culminated in the organismic theory of reality, which is accepted by pragmatists like Dewey. Dewey accepts the Darwinian theory of evolution and believes that mind is part of the organism. He thinks that mind developed with the organism, and as a result of experience. Its function is to guide the activity of the organism in the on-going process of life.

As indicated in the Foreword of this thesis and at the beginning of this chapter, the idea of the nature of mind is an important component in the larger concept of 'progressive education'. It is largely instrumental in determining the type of education to be offered the learner and the method to be used. It is only one component of the concept of progressive education, however, and must be

considered in conjunction with another, equally important, namely, the concept of the nature of change. Having traced the development of the idea of mind, we deal now with the second problem in Chapter II.

C H A P T E R I I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

The Problem

Another problem which the educator often encounters is the problem of change. It has much to do in determining the type of method the educator will employ. If Reality is changeless and we can attain a true knowledge of it, the educative process need only be concerned with the imparting of such knowledge. Knowledge of the universe, of the immediate environment, and of the verities, as well as of the nature of Reality could confidently be passed on from generation to generation. Nor would the educator have to be greatly concerned with the validity of the knowledge to be imparted. The nature of what "is", once determined, would need no further investigation, since its characteristics would be eternal. It would call for receptive learning by the learner; prescriptive teaching by the teacher.

What a difference there is if the universe is unstable! A changing environment allows us to "know" nothing about itself. It is different at the time you speak about it from the time you last observed it. The educator can have no true and lasting knowledge about it; therefore

he cannot impart information. He must train or lead the student to ascertain the exact nature of things for himself. Moreover, the student can estimate the nature of things only at a particular time and for a particular place. Tomorrow he may have to reconstruct his views. He must search for the truth continually. Education under such conditions cannot be a handing over of accumulated knowledge. It must be a training in ability to estimate or assess. Our values, too, are changeable. They grow out of, and are approved by, a society of a particular time. No eternal character is ascribed to them.

The educator is interested in still other aspects of the problem of change. He would like to know what is affected by the process. Is only inanimate nature affected, or are living creatures also involved? More important still, is man, and are his institutions and his culture undergoing a transformation? If so, what is the nature of the transformation? Is the change a mere flux, or is it developmental? If it is developmental, is the progress cyclical, that is, is there an Upward and a Downward Way, or is there an ever upward progression?

The educator would also like to know if the process of change is teleological (the plan of a divine being) or mechanical (caused by an inherent motion of the things themselves). If the process is teleological man can do little more than inform himself, as well as he is able, about

the divine plan and cheerfully play the part assigned to him. If the process is mechanistic, however, man might learn to control it and hence become an agent himself in the process of transformation. The two alternatives place man in quite different positions. If he can determine which of the two alternatives apply to him he has taken a large stride and has set himself on a firm base from which to direct his operations.

Early Greek Ideas of Change

Heraclitus, a Greek who lived about 500 B.C. gave the world its first unified philosophy of change. Earlier philosophers had not given much thought to the difficulty inherent in the transformation of a homogeneous world-stuff into a world of variety. Heraclitus had certain definite ideas about it. He believed that change is all-pervasive and perpetual. "You cannot step twice into the same river,"¹ he wrote. Heraclitus did not think, however, that the transitory character of the world is without plan. The universe is a process, a becoming. It appears to be moving onward, yet it does not make any appreciable progress.

Heraclitus' theory of flux is modified by his idea of identity of opposites. According to him "all things

1. Burnet, John: "Greek Philosophy -- Thales to Plato", (MacMillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1932). P.61.

are one".² In conformity with this idea he had to find a world-stuff that is continually changing and yet remains the same. He found such a world-stuff in fire. "It is not transformed in the process of transformation."³

Change is conditioned by strife. There is an inherent struggle among things, a struggle between what Heraclitus terms the "Upward" and the "Downward" Ways. The struggle is necessary to keep the universe in existence. "All things come into being and pass away through strife."⁴ Strife holds the Upward and Downward Ways in equilibrium.

Heraclitus' flux is actually only flux; the change does not seem to be towards the better or the more perfect. His world-stuff, though changeable, is yet unchanging. The struggle between the Upward and Downward Ways is a perpetual struggle, yet neither the Upward nor the Downward takes the upper hand for long. It is possible for one to rise, but the ascendancy is only temporary. The opposite comes again into position.

The Heraclitean theory of flux was attacked by Parmenides. He challenged the idea that change is possible.

2. Quotation from Fuller, B.A.G.: "A History of Philosophy", (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1945). P.49.

3. Ibid., P.54.

4. Ibid., P.57.

Reality, to him, was a plenum; there is no void, no empty space, and change cannot take place. His arguments influenced the pluralists, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, who accepted Parmenides' theory of a plenum but yet thought it necessary to give a logical reason for the change of phenomena.

Empedocles cut the Real into four "roots", Air, Water, Fire, and Earth. The things which we experience in everyday life are composed, he thought, of these four roots in different proportions. Any change that is noticeable is not caused by changes within the roots themselves, but is apparent because of changes in the position and proportion of the roots. He admits that there is a tendency for the roots to be moved about within the plenum and contends that the movement is caused by two outside forces, 'Love' and 'Strife'. Empedocles is anxious to be clear that the movers of Love and Strife are not inherent characteristics of the roots themselves since that would interfere with the Eleatic logic that Reality is inert, unchangeable, and immovable. He thinks of Love and Strife as corporeal substances which exist separately and apart from the roots themselves.

Anaxagoras made an advance over Empedocles by dividing the Real into many stuffs, which he called "seeds". He believed, as Parmenides did, that change cannot bring

about new qualities, but that as many elements exist as can be perceived by the senses. The seeds exist in different proportions to cause the existence of different objects. The predominating seed determines the type of object we experience. Every seed, however, contains a portion of every other seed. "The things that are in the world are not separated from one another or cut off with a hatchet,"⁵ "neither the warm from the cold, nor the cold from the warm".⁶ All things are "in everything, nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything".⁷ Change, then, comes about by the gain or loss of preponderance of the preponderating seed. Actually there is no change within Reality. There is merely a reshifting of the seeds. The only seed which is unmixed is Nous, or Mind.

The atomic idea of Reality was further improved by Leucippus and Democritus. Both believed that Reality is composed of an infinite number of individual plenums, which Democritus called "atoma". He explained all qualitative differences to quantitative differences. Change, he asserted, is due to movement in space. Leucippus maintained that empty space exists in which the atoms move freely, and that motion is inherent in all the atoms. No

5. Burnet, P.78.

6. Quotation from Fuller, P.79.

7. Ibid.

outside agent, like Love and Strife, is necessary to set the atoms in motion.

Anaxagoras contended that the seeds are not individually perceptible. He thus made an advance over philosophers like Heraclitus and Empedocles who believed that the world-stuff is apparent to the senses. Leucippus took a similar view with regard to the atoms. All philosophers thus far, however, including Anaxagoras, accepted the idea that the world-stuff is a tangible thing. With Plato we meet a new line of thought.

Plato accepted the Heraclitean flux as an accurate description of the sensible world, but he held that the Real is not perceptible to the senses. He found the Real not in a "tangible or corporeal world-stuff, but in an intelligible world-structure".⁸ The universe is unchanging "in the laws it obeys, the forms it exemplifies, the general definitions or ideas that remain constantly applicable to its behavior".⁹ So rapid and unfailing is the change of the sensible world that Plato drew up a plan for an ideal republic in which he sought to avert change and realize some measure of stability.

Plato had separated the world of particulars from the world of universals; ideas from concrete things. Aristotle brought them together again. He saw the universe

8. Ibid., P.129.

9. Ibid.

in a continual process of realization (progressive motion), and the particular existing together with the universal. To describe the process of self-realization Aristotle coined the word "entelechy", which implies a continual movement from the potential to the actual. Motion, according to Aristotle, has four causes, material, efficient, formal, and final. (Here Aristotle advanced a step beyond previous philosophers who usually attributed change to one cause alone.) Aristotle gave more emphasis to the formal cause than to the other three. He also thought of an unmoved mover who is the ultimate cause of all motion and change. This is still a teleological and not a deterministic idea.

Plotinus to Bruno

This period can be covered in a relatively short space since the contributions made in this particular train of thought (change and development) during this time were not very great. Plotinus (204-270 A.D.) might be given the credit for making the first appreciable contribution after Aristotle. He found the Real to be a "One", which is complete in itself, and is uncreated and unchanging. Paradoxically, however, the One, although unchanging, ceaselessly keeps on spending itself; that is, it pours out from its essence until every form of existence is actualized. When a new existence has separated itself

from its source it becomes different from, less than, and other than the One. It then turns back and yearns toward its source, however. This process Plotinus calls "epistrophe", which means that the individual object strives towards the One. There is thus a continual progressive motion.

Proclus (412-495), also deserves brief mention. He believed that the sensible world is in a ceaseless process of becoming. The process is directed by nature, the incorporeal principle of movement and alteration.

John Scotus Eriugena, the first original thinker of the middle ages, born about 847 A.D., theorized that the Divine is perpetually unfolding itself. There are four stages of Divine unfolding. First, there is the Father, "the nature that is uncreated but creates".¹⁰ His nature is too high for him even to be conscious of himself. Second, there is the Son, "the nature that both is created and creates".¹¹ Next in order follows the third person of the Trinity, who forms the intelligible structure of the universe, and in him God becomes conscious of himself. "This is the nature that is created but does not create."¹² The universe and all the objects it implies are an emanation from the Divine. In creating it God is creating himself. Finally God reaches the limits of his

10. Ibid., P.364.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

self-expression and enters back into himself in creating man, "the nature that neither creates nor is created".¹³ Motion, then, as the theory implies, is cyclical.

Aquinas (1227-1274 A.D.) needs only brief treatment in this chapter also, since his idea of a world-process is almost identical with that of Aristotle. It is, he thought, essentially a process of actualization of the potential. Forms exist in a graded series, so that a particular actualized form is potentiality to a higher one. There is thus a ladder of forms; a "graduated nature of the process of ascent".¹⁴

Bruno (1548-1600) introduced the concept of monadology into philosophy. A monad is a complete unit of existence, a complete entity. God is the highest of monads. He is the principle of unity and displays himself in the unity of all objects. The idea was perhaps suggested to Bruno by the atomists. It becomes an important principle in the philosophy of Leibnitz, and is treated more fully in Chapter I and in this chapter under Leibnitz.

Leibnitz--Hume--The Early Evolutionists

Leibnitz' theory of monads has already been dealt with under mind, in Chapter I. A few words in connection with his theory of development will suffice. The monads,

13. Ibid., P.365.

14. Ibid., P.405.

according to Leibnitz, are all independent. "One created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another."¹⁵ Moreover, they are immaterial. Each monad stands in a definite relation to the universal plan--a plan which is summed up in the ultimate reality, God. All the monads thus act in harmony with the rest of the world. None of the monads can develop beyond their possibilities, but each monad has certain potentialities toward which it matures. Development, then, consists in making actual for each monad the possibilities of its own nature. To Leibnitz the essential nature of each monad is thought, thus true development consists in clear thinking, in getting rid of confused concepts, and in attaining true and clear ideas.

In a sense Leibnitz' type of development is governed. Each monad is given its particular nature at the start, and the course of its development is fixed. It can only develop within its own nature. Each state of its development is a consequence of its preceding states and a determining condition of its future state. It almost appears that Leibnitz negates the freedom of man, since man is a slave to his own pattern of development. Man does have freedom of a type, however. He is not subject to influences from the outside; it is the law of his own nature that determines his future.

Hume had a novel idea of change. He accepted only sense impressions as a description of the world of objects, so that when we cease to perceive an object it ceases to exist. Objects thus not only change but cease to exist when our observation or our experience with them is interrupted. When we next observe or perceive what we think is the same object, it is merely a similar, but not the identical object. We speak of the continued existence of things because of our memory. We merely feign the continuance. Even personal identity, including the self, is mere supposition.

The early evolutionists suggested that change (development) is progressive. Change among animal and vegetable life is for the better. Locke, for example, noted that the gradations which separate animals from vegetable life are almost indiscernible, and that the same is true of differences separating living and inanimate matter. Hume also believed that the universe "grew" into its present shape as an individual organism grows. Diderot, De la Mettrie, Helvetius and Holbach all regarded change as a process of generation. They took note of the indeterminate boundaries that separate animate from inanimate things, and held that man's present state is the product of a long process of evolution from simple, primitive stock. These thinkers all agreed that there is no purpose or design in the process of development and

transformation, and claimed that the origin and direction is purely mechanical. They excluded all ideas of teleological design. Spencer and Darwin later developed the evolutionistic theory more fully.

Theories of Cultural Development

Thus far the ideas of change or development which have been dealt with concerned mainly matter of the self-realization of the Real. Condorcet (1743-1794) expanded the scope. He sketched the progress of man from primitive to contemporary times. He found that there is not only a biological advancement but that there is also a movement towards equality between individuals and between nations, and, generally, a movement towards human perfection. During man's advance towards perfection the chief obstacle to progress has always been ecclesiastical and political tyranny which, he believed, man will eventually overthrow by using his reason. A time will come, he thought, when there will be no more tyrants or priests to exploit humankind. All men will be free and all will be equal.

Condorcet believed that there is a possibility of perfecting human nature. Economic inequalities will be done away with. Education will improve. Medicine will advance enormously. Even death may in time be prevented. War will be abolished (in time); there will be equality of the sexes, and the practice of eugenics will improve humankind.

When this high level of human living is attained men will forget about the unpleasant past and live joyfully in anticipation of the future. Progress is thus extended to man's cultural life as well as his physical. The arts and sciences promote the progress and well-being of man.

Rousseau's viewpoints are opposed, almost diametrically, to those of Condorcet. According to him the least civilized and least advanced peoples live the happiest lives and they are least corrupt. "God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil."¹⁶ Civilization corrupts man's native goodness. The arts and sciences lead man to luxury which, in turn, undermines the virtues of man. Civilization also breeds "inequalities and distinctions of class and wealth".¹⁷ Our economic and social evils are the result of man's falling away from nature. The solution lies not in more civilization but in a return to nature. Our growing civilization is thus detrimental to the welfare of mankind. It is a growth away from perfection.

Tolstoy, a century later, was in close agreement with Rousseau. Where Rousseau advocated a return to nature Tolstoy advocated a return to the simple life of the peasant. Both men were suspicious of the benefits of civilization. Both rejected the idea of an ethereal type

16. Rousseau, Jean Jaques, "Emile" (Everyman's Library -- J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London -- E.F. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York.) Bk.I, P.5.

17. Fuller, P.201.

of progress. Tolstoy looked for a well-fed peasantry rather than for a well-ordered universe. His idea of progress was utilitarian and pragmatic.

With Fichte (1762-1813) we return to the ethereal type of progress. He, too, believed that the world is one of process rather than of stability, but that the process is essentially one of "aspiration and a search for true existence".¹⁸ It is therefore necessary to fix our affections on the eternal if peace and stability are to be attained. They are attained through thought and knowledge; that is, by contemplating the eternal. In this way we put on stability and eternity and become one with the source of all existence. It is an idealistic stability that Fichte has in mind.

Hegel (1770-1831) thought that change is all-pervasive. Reality, according to him, is whole and rational. The Ultimate Reason pervades the whole universe, including nature. The Real is continually realizing himself; therefore all things are in a continual process of development. Everything is "Becoming". Hegel explained that Becoming is a synthesis of Being and Not-Being. "Becoming includes within itself the truth of each---is and is not."¹⁹

Nature is a medium through which the Ultimate expresses himself. At any particular time there is a whole series of

18. Ibid.

19. Rogers, A.K., "A Student's History of Philosophy" (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1937.) P.412.

grades of development. There are no "states" in the process, however. All is continually moving upward. All is continually increasing in reality. Man is the Ultimate's highest attainment in the process of development.

Development results from a process of perpetual reconstruction. Each portion of reality (partial truth) passes into its opposite, then a process of reconciliation and finally a synthesis results. The process of reconstruction passes through three phases, thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. (This process is further dealt with in Chapter III.)

Man, his environment, his institutions and culture all represent a particular degree in the development of the Real. As a matter of fact, the development of the Real is objectified in nature and in social institutions. The child in school realizes itself by participating in social life. The importance of the school in introducing the child into social life is also dealt with in the next chapter. In contrast to the impressions which civilization made on Rousseau and Tolstoy, the progress of culture was of great significance to Hegel.

Schopenhauer reverted to the view of Rousseau in so far as cultural development is concerned. He saw the world as a process, but believed that the process is irrational, unmoral and blind. "It is a will to be, a will to live, no matter how."²⁰ The essence of the Will is

discontent; its aim is to be, and to assert itself at any price and in any manner. Purpose, morality, good and happiness do not enter into the process. Its cravings conflict. The universe is therefore evil.

Schopenhauer notes that there is no harmony in the universe. Inanimate objects destroy one another, living creatures devour one another, and sensitive creatures have no regard for the feelings of one another. There is continual competition; continual destruction; continual suicide.

Out of this senseless activity only Will emerges more and more completely. In human beings we get our most correct manifestation of the progressive emergence of Will. It is not the universe or civilization, but Will, which is undergoing a process of realization.

How different is Froebel's idea of development! Where Schopenhauer saw a senseless activity Froebel saw a harmonious development in the universe. Indeed, there is a unity, a connectedness between all things in the universe. "There is a close (cosmical) inner connection of the whole cosmical development,"²¹ he says. The world process, including education, is, therefore, one of unfoldment. It is the business of the educator to help the

21. Froebel, Friedrich, "Autobiography", Trans. by Michaelis and Moore, P.89. (Quotation taken from Quick, Robert H. "Essays on Educational Reformers", (Longmans, Green and Co., 1895.) P.389.

unfoldment proceed in harmony with the divine.

By education, then, the divine essence of man should be unfolded, brought out, lifted into consciousness, and man himself raised into free, conscious obedience to the divine principle that lives in him, and to a free representation of this principle in his life.²²

The process goes on, not only harmoniously, but continuously.

"God," Froebel philosophizes, "creates and works productively in uninterrupted continuity."²³ There is thus no harmony in outlook between Froebel and Schopenhauer.

Karl Marx partially accepted the Hegelian description of the world process. He agreed that there is a constant reconstruction of opposites and that it passes through the stages of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Resulting conditions affect and modify the antecedent conditions, and vice versa. Thesis and antithesis affect and change one another, and the synthesis is the new situation created by their interplay.

Marx rejected, however, Hegel's assertion that the characteristics of the world process are teleological, that is, the unfolding of an Absolute's design. To him the world process was entirely material in content and mechanistic in operation: not mental in any way. "It is matter in motion, extended in space and time, and existing in and by itself, independent of any mental awareness of, or

22. Froebel, Friedrich: "Education of Man", Trans. by W.N. Hallmann, C.D. Appleton and Company, New York -- London) P.4.

23. Ibid., P.30.

reflection upon it."²⁴ The material world was not even created by a mind.

Marx had a second objection to Hegel's system.

He felt that Hegel had made the world process a closed circle in which the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis had already been completely accomplished and displayed. To cap the climax, Hegel had identified the final synthesis in all departments of life with the existing conditions of his own day, and made them the ultimate expression of the Absolute Idea.²⁵

Marx contended that the world process is open and continuous. It is circular, to be sure, but the circle is not closed. It is spiral and becomes different as it goes on. Thus humanity, human institutions and culture are in a process of evolution. No stage in the process can be regarded as conclusive. Marx was opposed to any institution (like Christianity) which bolsters or sanctions existing conditions and institutions because such action tends to keep the circle closed, and so puts a stop to progress.

To Comte development meant evolution of intellectual activity. Thought, he said, passes through three stages of development, namely, theological, metaphysical and positivistic (truly scientific). The first is a beginning stage, the second a transition stage, and the last is the final goal of all thinking. According to Comte the law

24. Fuller, P.371.

25. Ibid., P.372.

of the three stages exemplifies a law of growth. It is of some significance that Comte's final stage is scientific thought. It is through science that thought is brought into action; that is, into practical use. Scientific thought is considered the highest of all thought because it has a direct bearing on science, and it is through science that the world advances. Comte abandons the search for an ultimate reality and for the essence of things. The laws of phenomena only interest him. He is interested, not in their substance, but in their activity. The core of Comte's thought, then, is activity---purposive activity.

Darwin to Dewey

The theory of Darwin is one of the most influential in the general theme of development. Darwin's theory supposes an entirely mechanical development from the simple to the complex. He puts the whole of existence, organic as well as inorganic, under the reign of natural law. Darwin observed that the offspring of any species is slightly different from its parents. The slight difference might be either an advantage or a disadvantage to the offspring. If the variation is advantageous it will help the new species to cope better with the obstacles to its existence which it encounters in the environment. Some of the species thus become more fit and come out on top in the struggle for existence. Thus we have Darwin's famous

doctrine of "survival of the fittest". Since only the fittest survive (those whose variations are favorable), there is a continual progress in the development of species.

Darwin's theory had important implications. It meant that forms are not eternal; that unsuitable forms perish, and that only those forms survive which can cope with surrounding conditions. The forms we know are existent because of a long process of development. They have undergone progressive changes. This implies that man is not excepted from the process of evolution. He was not given any pre-eminence by the Ultimate in the world of things. He had to start at the bottom with the others and only reached his present position by being more successful in the struggle for existence. He has reached the top of the ladder through his own efforts.

Spencer, who accepted Darwin's theory of evolution in principle, attempted to frame a law which would describe the process. He gave us the Spencerian formula:

Evolution is a continuous change from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to definite, coherent heterogeneity of structure and function, through successive differentiations and integrations.²⁶

He meant by this that there is a continual development which

involves on the one hand a growing specialization and division of labor, while, on the other, these organs and functions are bound more and more intimately together to form an organic unity or system.²⁷

26. Rogers, P.453.

27. Ibid.

Social institutions are not excluded from Spencer's theory. History, he contended, shows that social institutions are not made, but are the result of a process of growth. Families integrated into tribes, tribes into communities and communities into states. There is progressive movement towards greater complexity. In this respect he advanced beyond Darwin who was concerned primarily with biological evolution.

Trendelenburg (1802-1872) took the same extreme viewpoint with regard to motion as Hume did with sense impressions. He reduced reality (both thought and being) to motion. Thought, however, is pre-eminent. Space, time and the categories are all forms of thought.

Motion, Trendelenburg believed, is purposive. It has an inherent design which it is unfolding and which it expresses in organic life. In conscious selves motion reaches self-fulfillment. The process is intelligible and not mechanistic.

Bosanquet (1835-1908) thought that the character of the world process is dramatic.

All the world's a stage, and the whole world process is a play. The absolute is an artist--- a playwright, actor, stage-manager, scene-painter and scene-shifter rolled into one---who himself takes all the parts and recites all the lines in a universal drama he has imagined.²⁸

Here we have an entirely new idea. To Fichte the world process was the career of a moral being, to Hegel the career

of a rational being; to Bosanquet it is the career of an artist.

The implications of this philosophy are far-reaching. Sin and suffering no longer present a great problem. They do not displease an Absolute Reason, but rather add to the satisfaction of an absolute artist. They serve a useful purpose since they have a tremendous dramatic value and add enormously to the drama of the absolute artist. The drama is cosmic and all-pervasive so each one has a part to play.

The individual can readily conquer his sin and suffering. He has but to consider his part as a contribution to the whole drama. He helps to perfect it. He should not consider what he gets from it individually. He should not complain. By enduring pain and expiating sin he triumphs over them because they are acts in a universal play.

Nietsche has a place all his own in the concept of development. He bases his philosophy on the supremacy of will---an idea akin to that of Schopenhauer, though to Nietsche it is the Will to Power, not the Will to Live. The Will to Power is the vitality which forever strives upward and on. It has no consideration for any standards or codes which imply submission, weakness or passivity. Thus religion, morality and truth are looked upon with disdain. Truth, to Nietsche, is that kind of error without

which a certain sort of living being (the weak being) cannot exist. Nietzsche worships only the courageous soul because only he who endures comes out on top. Pain and war are not to be shunned. They are the ways to improvement of the species. If the weak cannot endure they must fall by the way; allowances cannot be made for them. Modesty, benevolence, chastity and the like, are brushed aside because they are obstacles in the way of the purpose of the Will to Power, the life force. Those who would be masters can only know heroism, pride, spirit, and above all, efficiency.

The ultimate goal in the process of development is a heroic race of "over-men" or "supermen" who are beyond good and evil. They live dangerously, play with death, and use the weaker beings merely as a foundation on which to raise themselves to a higher existence. This idea is somewhat related to Darwin's theory of "survival of the fittest". Darwin thinks of an organismic development, however. Intelligence eventually appears to guide the process. Nietzsche thinks only of self-assertion by the Will to Power. He places the highest possible premium on man's ability to raise himself, though the ascent is possible only to a select few.

Another philosopher who based his philosophy on a life force is Bergson. The core of his system is a "vital impulse" which influences the development of everything.

Basically this force is not intelligent; it is merely an urge. In man, however, it has produced intelligence. The life force is so restless and spontaneous that nothing in the world stays fixed for a moment. Lifeless objects, living organisms and cultural institutions are all affected.

A perpetual progressive change occurs in everything. "To exist is to change, to change is to mature, and to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly."²⁹ Existence implies a "continual creation of forms, and a continual elaboration of the absolutely new".³⁰ In this sense creation is not a mysterious thing; we experience it in ourselves. We, ourselves, are creative beings.

To James reality is nothing but experience. Experience is not made up of isolated things or separate data. It is continuous and flowing. He concedes that our experience thickens into "things" or "substances", but this is due to our consciousness which is favorably or unfavorably affected by certain experiences. "Interest" and "attention" are what might be called "categories" of our consciousness. When attention and interest wane or become more volitional our experience becomes affected and what we have known as a certain object becomes different. Hence it has changed. Actually the change occurs only

29. Rogers, P.471

30. Ibid.

within experience.

Change, according to James, is very rapid. Our experiences continually shade into one another. There is no stability and there are no eternal things or transcendental verities. What our experience tells us about reality is real at the time we experience it; tomorrow it may be otherwise. The world process is uncertain and we must take risks. The game is exciting, however, and the risks are worth taking.

Dewey accepts the idea that existence is precarious, and states that life is "experience". The nature of experience is activity and the activity is creative. Activity is also progressive, resulting in a gradual but continual advancement of the race and of civilization. Dewey opposes all stereotyped ideals and proposes in their place the "method of experimental science". Since development is so perpetual Dewey is not greatly concerned about what the future will bring forth. He is more concerned with making life as intelligent as possible in the present.

Dewey is particularly prone to apply the idea of change to education and is quite lavish in distributing the idea throughout his writings. His emphasis is always on indefinite growth as against mere change or development towards a certain predetermined goal. In "Democracy and Education" he distinguishes between growth and unfoldment, for example, "Unfolding," he says, "is conceived not as

continuous growing, but as the unfolding of latent powers toward a definite goal".³¹ Dewey does not concede that the limit of development is set. He believes that the way is open to indefinite progress in all phases of human experience.

Summary

The material of this chapter reveals that the reality of change is generally recognized by philosophers. Numerous theories have been advanced to explain the nature of change. The theories generally indicate the evolution of a 'continuous-progressive-mechanical' as against a 'limited-cyclical-teleological' concept of change; also the idea that change is all pervasive and is not limited to any particular sphere.

The atomists (Democritus and Leucippus) gave us the first modern theory of change, based on mechanistic principles. Aristotle came forward with the first theory of progressive and unhindered development, but according to him development is teleological. His views were later upheld by Aquinas. Leibnitz believed that reality consists of monads---reals, akin to the atoms of Democritus and Leucippus---which develop in accordance with certain inherent potentialities. No outside force is involved, but development is limited to the potentialities inherent

31. Dewey, John: "Democracy and Education", (The MacMillan Company, 1920.) Chap.V, P.65.

in the atoms. The evolutionists---Locke, Diderot, Helvetius, and later Darwin and Spencer---argued against this viewpoint. They believed that all species have evolved. Darwin suggested that the survival of particular species now existent is the result of a perpetual struggle for life. Effort, therefore, is essential to existence. This view is also taken by Dewey.

Condorcet enlarged the scope of change and included man's cultural life in the process. In this idea he was supported, generally, by Hegel, Froebel, Marx, Spencer and, later, Dewey. (Dewey believes that change pervades all existence.) Generally, these philosophers believed that man can go on perfecting himself and his ways of living indefinitely. In a large measure, then, man becomes the master of his own fate.

We have now traced the growth of several principles which are basic to progressive education. In Chapter I it was found that the whole organism (including mind and body) is considered as 'real' by progressivists. This calls for all-round development in education. In Chapter II we find that more recent philosophers, like Darwin, Spencer and Dewey, believe change to be mechanical, and subject to control by man. This places man in a more favorable position than does a teleological concept of change. Finally, more recent philosophers believe that development is not limited, either to particular phases or

to a particular level. The way is open to infinite progress. With these basic philosophical principles established we now deal, in Chapter III, with the impact they have had, and are having, on educational thought.

C H A P T E R I I I

LEARNING BY DOING

The Problem

Activism in the school has, at different times, been recommended to attain different ends. It was first given support in the belief that it facilitates cognition. Comenius stressed sense realism for this reason. Another reason given for its support is that it satisfies the child's natural urge for activity; in this regard Rousseau is an example. Froebel held that children are naturally creative, and that activity in the school helps to develop their creative powers. He thus advocated activity for development.

Science has helped to stimulate the growth of the belief that education should be an active process. As it disproved many old cherished beliefs more reliance came to be placed on man's ability to search for, and find the true nature of things. To discover the nature of things experimentation (activity) is necessary. Learning by doing, then, has another important function. It aids the learner to discover and determine what can be accepted as truth.

In more recent years still other reasons have been

added to those usually offered in support of activism. Activity is said to be more in accord with actual life than is receptivity. If the school is to be an "epitome of life"¹ there must be activity. 'Doing' helps to facilitate the interaction between the student and his environment. He gets experience in dealing with actual life problems, so it provides a continuity in the life process. Finally, it makes the school a happy phase of the child's life; it helps to develop body, mind and spirit, and facilitates the all-round development of the individual.

Contributors Before Comenius

Education by doing is not new. Pre-literate peoples employed the method of activity almost exclusively. All learning the pupil did was associated directly with life. Moreover, learning did not stop at any particular time. People learned as they lived, and lived as they learned; and all this without theorizing that 'education is life' and 'life is growth'.

To say that education by doing is not new is not the same as saying that the theory of learning by doing is not new. However, even the theory has roots reaching far back

1. Monroe, Paul, "Brief Course in the History of Education", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1911) P.371.

into history. It only becomes more loudly proclaimed and more widely acclaimed as history progresses.

The idea that the educative process should involve activity on the part of the learner dates back to Aristotle. One might even say that it began (at least in some degree) with Plato. Plato did not form any pedagogic rules about sense realism or empiricism in his educational work, but his dialogues portray a spirit of inquiry, of restlessness, and activity, though the activity is primarily mental. There is a continual reconstruction of definitions and of ideas. Socrates, for example, is never satisfied that an opinion is final and definite. He has a knack of pulling the foundation from under the feet of those who believe they have achieved certainty and finality in any sphere of knowledge. By infusing doubt into their minds he points out that further reconstruction is necessary, and reconstruction implies continued activity.

Aristotle moved beyond Plato in this respect. He introduced the idea that sensory contact with one's environment is necessary in order to understand it. Not only is contact with the world necessary, but a contact with men is necessary in order to achieve inner balance, or a mean. Aristotle held that the mental is not independent of the physical, and that, therefore, the two operate together.

Aristotle's concept of activism is implicit again in his idea of an active soul. He believed that the soul, which he said has a tripartite character (vegetative, appetitive, and rational), is an important driving force, urging the individual on to inquiry and investigation. Curiosity and a desire for happiness lead to investigation, thence to more knowledge, thence to interest in new and further experiences, and onward again to further investigation and knowledge. This implies a continuous process of growth.

Finally, Aristotle's practical work must be taken into account. He was not only a theorist but a research worker as well. He investigated all branches of knowledge, and carefully recorded the results of his findings. His work was so convincing that he was accepted as an authority for many centuries. It is important to remember that he achieved his results, not through acquiescence and acceptance of traditional beliefs, but through scientific research and investigation; through self-activity.

After Aristotle we find that many centuries elapse before any constructive ideas in educational philosophy appear. To be sure, Quintilian (in the first century A.D.) prescribed a fuller and more positive education for 'orators' than students of the time usually received. He had in mind a well-rounded man of affairs as the finished product, and thought activities like games and plays should be a part

of schoolwork. His ideas were too far advanced for his time, however, and brought no immediate results. The idea of a practical education did not harmonize with the general philosophy of the time. The idea of the old philosophers as to the duality of mind and body was generally accepted, and the mental element was given precedence over the corporeal. Hence education was primarily concerned with mental training and became bookish. Moreover, since the main driving force behind education during the middle ages was the Church, education was forced to go hand in hand with Church dogma. This situation lasted without being questioned until the fifteenth century.

The first educator to detach himself from the notions of his time was Rabelais (1483-1553). Rabelais introduced a model pupil, Gargantua, and has him educated by methods other than those which were in vogue at the time. First Gargantua forgets all that he has ever learned and makes a new start (anticipating Locke's *tabula rasa*). Then he proceeds to learn about things. He gets information from books also, but the information he obtains therefrom he applies to practical use; he does not accept it uncritically. He also observes things out-of-doors, such as trees and plants, and compares them with what is written about them in the books of the ancients. Thus he tests the validity of knowledge. Sense realism and

criticism are introduced into education.

Gargantua is also occupied with handwork; sawing wood, threshing, painting, and carving. A closer connection with actual life is made by visits to handicraftsmen. Physical education is also introduced, but this is done with the aim of preparing him for the gentleman's occupation of war (anticipating another of Locke's ideas), and not with a view to improving his health. Thus Rabelais still accepted the ideal of the Renaissance and compromised with convention. He made 'suggestions' about a more practical program of instruction, by introducing 'real things'. He did not have a complete, new philosophy of education.

Montaigne (1533-1592) went a step further in claiming that acquisition of knowledge is not suited to a gentleman or man of action, a move away from the idea that a human being is a passive and receptive animal. "To know by heart is not to know,"² he says. Education, he thought, should be a development and exercising of the faculties. (It should be noted that this does not imply an integrated development of the whole organism, but merely a development of faculties.) Montaigne asserted that knowledge must become a part of the mind, and not

2. Montaigne: "The Essays of Montaigne", Trans. by E.J. Trechmann, (Oxford University Press). VolI, P.150.

merely be fastened on to it. "Things borrowed from others," he writes, "he will transform and blend so as to make a work of his own, to wit, his judgement."³ In general, Montaigne admired men of action, men like the Spartans.

Montaigne was a sense realist. He maintained that, while it is possible for us to become learned by learning from others, we can become wise only by our own wisdom. He moved even farther away from books than did Rabelais, saying, "In our studies whatever presents itself before us is book enough; a roguish trick of a page, a blunder of a servant, a jest at the table, are so many new subjects".⁴

We find another great advance in Montaigne in his idea of judging things by their practical value, his idea of taking the course of action which promises the greatest human effect. "Let him estimate the profit he has gained," Montaigne advises, not by the testimony of his memory, but of his life."⁵ Such an attitude implies reflection and autonomy on the part of the learner, and this is precisely where Montaigne makes one of his greatest contributions to the philosophy of education. He writes:

We must let him pass everything through a sieve, and store nothing in his head on mere authority and trust...To him Aristotle's principles should be no more principles than

3. Ibid.

4. Quotation taken from Quick, Robert H. "Essays on Educational Reformers", (Longmans, Green and Co., New York -- London 1895) P.76.

5. Montaigne: Vol.I, P.148.

those of the Stoics and Epicureans; let their various theories be put to him, and he will choose, if he is able; if not, he will remain in doubt. Only fools are certain and cocksure.⁶

He assumes that man is completely autonomous and free from secular obstructions in so far as education is concerned. Man should assert himself. He should have the right to decide his own course of action, to observe, inquire, and use his own judgment in the acceptance or rejection of ideas. Montaigne did not condemn religion but held it to be more a convention than a necessity.

A further advance in activistic thinking resulted from Bacon's (1561-1626) introduction of the inductive method into the philosophy of education. The inductive method is not a method of teaching, but a method of discovery of knowledge. Hitherto educators had concentrated their efforts on the passing on of knowledge they believed they had. Bacon questioned the validity of assumed knowledge. Too much of it was tainted with tradition and convention, he thought. He believed that there must be a deliberate and conscious effort to discover and ascertain the validity of beliefs.

To arrive at truth he contended that all prejudices and settled habits of thinking and perceiving must be abandoned. One must get rid of the four idols---of the

6. Ibid., P.149.

tribe, the cave, the market place, and the theatre. His inductive method demanded a continual watch for "negative instances" which might invalidate a conclusion at any time. Hence continued experimentation is necessary. This implies activity on the part of those who seek to learn.

Bacon did not pursue the inductive method himself; he merely speculated about it. Moreover, he did not think of it in terms of classroom procedure, but rather as a method by which the philosopher can establish the certainty of knowledge, and by which he can discover knowledge not yet ascertained. He stipulated that one must obey nature in order to conquer her.

The Sense Realists---Comenius---Locke---Francke

Comenius, the great Moravian educator (1592-1671), formulated the first laws or methods of learning, based on a definite philosophy, wherein the bodily organs would come to the aid of the struggling intellect. He believed there is nothing in the understanding which was not first in the senses. Comenius gave further effect to his ideas by writing text books, of which the *Orbis Pictus* is the most famous. The *Orbis Pictus* is an attempt to combine the learning of foreign language with visual aids. This gives us an indication of Comenius' concern for conceptualization, a concern that Pestalozzi later was to share with him.

Comenius believed that life is a continual process of development; development towards the divine, so that there is a need for the perpetual activity of children. In his "School of Infancy" he even suggests that play should be given an important part in the educative process. He still thinks of random play, however, and not of the adult-supervised kind of play that Froebel was to advocate two centuries later.

An important point, and a defective one, in Comenius' philosophy of education is his idea of pansophism, the idea that man should 'know all things'. He believed that, since man is a rational creature, he has a need for such all-inclusive knowledge in order to be able to think accurately. The senses are the portals through which the knowledge is to be conveyed. Comenius did not think of the senses primarily as agents in search of knowledge, or of training the senses. It is significant, in this connection, that the *Orbis Pictus* described all the pictures. No attempt was made to let the students give their own descriptions. Another point to note is that Comenius was very careful not to repeat words. This, he thought, is necessary to convey more and more knowledge to the student. His zeal for pansophism resulted in the condensation of large bodies of knowledge, and hence in artificiality. Abstract concepts, for example the idea of God, were also

introduced; this was a departure from his principle that the simple and concrete should come before the complex and abstract.

Comenius, as can be inferred from his theory, attempted to apply Bacon's empiricism to classroom procedure. He believed, however, that science is not independent, and that the aid of divine inspiration is necessary. His ideas thus combine Bacon's empirical method with that of the Christian concept of a divine order. He was a sense realist only in so far as parts of his psychology and methodology of learning are concerned, and not in any epistemological sense.

Another theory which greatly influenced educational thought came from Locke (1632-1704). He established the 'tabula rasa' theory, a theory according to which the mind of the child is a blank tablet, or wax, on which impressions are made by reports from the senses. This was a serious blow to the theory of innate ideas, a theory which dates back to the days of Plato. If the mind is blank (like a tablet) and pliable (like wax) the whole personality of the child can be shaped or molded by the educator. The tabula rasa theory gave a much more important place to education in the development of the human personality than had hitherto been accorded to it.

Locke was much concerned about 'understanding' or

conceptualization, as Comenius had been before him. Knowledge, according to him, is the "internal perception of the mind"⁷, and it must come by the way of the senses. He asserts,

Until we see it with our own eyes and perceive it with our own understandings, we are as much in the dark and as void of knowledge as before, let us believe any learned authorities as much as we will.⁸

The young child, according to Locke, is unable to reason; thus he believed that the child should be prepared for the age of reason through the formation of good habits, and through attention to physical health. Locke aimed for a virtuous and wise man as against an informed one. Education to him meant the development of capacities; hence he placed learning last in the order of importance. He extolled reasoning almost to the point of reverence. "The faculty of reasoning," he writes, "seldom or never deceived those who trusted it."⁹ He claimed to be disdainful of authority and tradition, though other points in his philosophy did bear out this position.

Locke goes counter to his position in more than one instance. For example, in spite of his appeal to reason and to sense realism, he did not advocate an unconditional

7. Quick, P.222.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., P.235.

inquiry into the nature of things; nor did he believe in the flexible and unprescribed development of the human personality. He contradicted his own theory of 'tabula rasa' by asserting that "there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being"¹⁰, and that "we cannot want a clear proof of him"¹¹. His theory of development was also circumscribed by a rigid discipline which was more akin to a process of molding by the educator than to the unfoldment theory of later educators. His notions of development are also greatly cramped by restriction of his philosophy to what is requisite for a gentleman. He was still advocating a compromise with tradition and convention, while at the same time criticizing such an attitude. His policy was one of a mixture of progressivism and conservatism.

Like Comenius, Locke still thought of the senses as gateways through which knowledge may be forced to the mind. His constant concern about 'mind' also seems to indicate that he gave it pre-eminence over the senses.

The ideas of the educational reformers aforementioned were further expanded and given practical effect in the first Realschule, founded by August Hemann Francke (1663-1727),

10. Locke, John: "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Collated and Annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1894). Vol.II, Bk.IV, Chap.X, Sec.I, P.306.

11. Ibid., Vol.II, Bk.IV, Chap.X, Sec.6, P.309.

at Halle, in Germany. At this school 'real things', known as 'realien', were used as aids to education. Instruction took place through the use of such things as plows, churns, and models of buildings and ships. Field trips and visits to artisans were made, the former to collect specimens, the latter to see at first hand how goods are produced.

As Francke was a follower of such educational reformers as Ratke (who preceded Comenius by about twenty years), Comenius, and Locke, he also anticipated the romanticism of Rousseau to a certain degree. He believed in the Christian spirit of love (similar to Pestalozzi), and of sympathy towards the children. Teachers, he thought, should be kind, patient, and affectionate towards children.

Advocates of Education According to Nature

A new aspect of sense realism was brought into educational theory by Rousseau. Rousseau, like his predecessors, believed that learning should employ the senses. However, he not only held that learning should come to the mind by way of the senses but that the senses themselves should be trained and exercised so that we can judge more accurately by them. He explains:

To train the senses it is not enough merely to use them, we must learn to judge by their means, to learn to feel, so to speak; for we

cannot touch, see, or hear, except as we
have been taught.¹²

He based his beliefs on the child's restlessness and curiosity, and on the idea that there is a natural pattern of development. Moreover, he noticed that a child is not only curious and anxious to explore things, but that he also enjoys changing them -- "change is what he seeks"¹³. The educator, according to Rousseau, should give the child the freedom and opportunity to expand his activity. Finally, Rousseau contended that emotion and feeling enter into the learning process. Hitherto emotions had been neglected, or even considered wicked. Rousseau believed that emotion and feeling are as much a part of life as thinking, and that due consideration should be given to the influence they have in education. The senses are not to be employed merely for cognitive purposes but also for mere enjoyment. He thus brought to attention another aspect of all-round development.

Emile gets no formal instruction until he is twelve years of age. Until then he "loses time"¹⁴ and merely becomes acquainted with his environment. The tutor is always on the alert to create situations and experiences

12. Rousseau, Jean Jaques, "Emile" (Everyman's Library -- J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London -- E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York.) P.97.

13. Ibid., P.34.

14. Ibid., P.57.

favorable to the natural growth of the child. Even when Emile's intellectual education begins (at twelve) the boy still learns by doing. In co-operation with the tutor he constructs his own apparatuses, and together they engage in carpentry.

It is apparent, from the foregoing, that Rousseau held sense experiences to be important for several reasons: for all-round development of the child, to satisfy the needs of the child which are the result of his perpetual urge for activity, to give the child a chance to enjoy life, and to develop his instincts and emotions naturally and harmoniously. He also included cognition as a function of the senses. He believed that, in order to develop according to nature the learner must be in contact with nature. To develop the child's accuracy of observation and perception he advocated drawing and music. Drawing, according to Rousseau, must be from objects, not merely an imitative exercise. To Rousseau, unlike to Locke and Comenius, learning consisted less in knowing than in doing.

What Rousseau advocated, a German educator, John Bernhard Basedow (1723-1790) attempted to put into effect. He established an experimental school, known as the "Philanthropinum". It was the first school to set aside traditional procedures and launch itself on improved principles. Accepting Rousseau's idea of freedom, Basedow treated the children as children and not as little adults.

Their hair, for example, was cut short and they were permitted to wear loose clothes. Latin was taught conversationally, Handicrafts, gymnastics, and field trips were part of the school programme.

The first half of the nineteenth century was destined to be particularly productive in educational thought. Three of the greatest educators in history carried on their work during this time. They were Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbart.

Pestalozzi was the first of the trio. He was not merely a thinker in educational theory, but also a doer. Bacon arrived at his inductive method deductively, and Comenius arrived at his laws of teaching through analogies, not empirically. Pestalozzi, one of the first men to do so, arrived at his conclusions after careful and painstaking experimentation and observation.

Pestalozzi was a supporter of the idea of development, of instruction through the senses, and of co-operation with nature in education. "I laid great stress on what usually affected the senses"¹⁵, he wrote, and again, "Teach me, summer day, that man, formed from the dust of the earth, grows and ripens like the plant rooted in the soil."¹⁶ He even goes so far as to say that human knowledge

15. Quick, P.337.

16. Ibid., P.310.

begins with sense perception:

The most essential point from which I start is this:-- Sense impression of Nature is the only true foundation of human instruction, because it is the only true foundation of human knowledge.¹⁷

We have here a close resemblance to Locke's theory of tabula rasa.

Like Comenius and Locke, Pestalozzi was much concerned with the formation of clear concepts. He writes, "I try to follow in elementary instruction the mechanical laws by which man rises from sense-impressions to clear ideas."¹⁸ For this reason he introduced object lessons. He did not abandon verbal learning entirely but used it together with sense perception. The child was to proceed from sense-impressions to conceptualization.

Closely allied with his idea of sense experience is his notion that there should be an atmosphere of love between the teacher and the learner, and among the learners themselves. "The essential principle of education is not teaching," said Pestalozzi; "it is love." Again he says, "The child loves and believes before it thinks and acts."¹⁹ Love is something that must be experienced. It is necessary in order to develop the emotional stability of the child;

17. Pestalozzi, J.H., "How Gertrude Teaches Her Children", Trans. by L.E. Holland and F.C. Turner, (C.W. Bardeen, Publisher, 1898.) P.316.

18. Ibid., P.332.

19. Ibid., P.358.

it is also the foundation on which the moral life of the child is to be based.

Much as Pestalozzi wrote and expounded, his practical work is the best evidence of the success of his ideas. At Neuhof, as later at Stanz, he worked together with the children, in the house, in the garden, and in the field. Much of the work done was of the manual type. The pupils' separate lessons were closely associated with their work and with religion. Language was taught largely through conversation. All knowledge that was not a basis for action was considered to have little value.

Pestalozzi believed that at no time does the pupil have an empty mind, or tabula rasa. Thus positive experiences are necessary in early childhood to create confidence and bring forth morally positive reactions.

The man to complete the ideas of Comenius and Pestalozzi was Froebel (1783-1852). Both the Moravian and the Swiss reformers had had ideas of development, and that development was somehow connected with the divine; in fact the development was believed to be towards the divine. Divinity was conceived as being more or less casual, a mover, in a sense, separate and distinct from the organism. Froebel made the link between man and divinity, and between nature and divinity a much closer one.

His idea was closely akin to pantheism. He believed that man and nature spring from the same source, and they are both "governed by the same laws"²⁰. He writes, "There is a close (cosmical) inner connection of the whole cosmical development."²¹ Thus man and nature seem mutually to explain each other. Self-activity and a close connection with external objects becomes essential.

Froebel came out with the new idea that children have an inherent instinct for creativeness. Hitherto the idea that children were restless and wish to meddle with things, also Rousseau's theory that they like to change things had been introduced into educational thought. Froebel believed that the child's urge is to create, not merely to change. He based education directly upon God and thought that man should "create and bring forth like God"²². The creative instinct, he thought, brings about what is "good", the "good" being the link between creature and creator. He took Pestalozzi's reverence for the child much more seriously than Pestalozzi himself and allowed himself to be guided by the development of the child rather than be the guide of the child's development. He writes that education "should necessarily be passive,

20. Quick, P.389.

21. Froebel, Friedrich: "Autobiography", Trans. by Michaelis and Moore, P.89. Quotation taken from Quick, P.389.

22. Froebel, Friedrich: "The Education of Man", Trans. by W.N. Hallmann, (D. Appleton and Company, New York -- London) P.31

following, only guarding and protecting, not prescriptive, categorical, interfering"²³. Froebel would aid the child's self-expression, not interfere with it.

Froebel would encourage spontaneous self-expression through the means of play. Here Froebel made another great contribution to educational thought: he considered play to be important in itself, important as in the child's development of unfoldment. Hitherto play had been looked upon with disdain, or it had been used as a "sugar-coating" to make instruction more pleasurable. Froebel would leave play unrestrained by the educator. He was willing to descend to childishness of the pupils rather than raise them to the level of adults. In the kindergarten Froebel allowed play to be free under adult guidance and supervision. Play, according to Froebel, has educational value but it is not to be turned into instructional procedure.

To encourage the Pupils' activity Froebel incorporated Pestalozzi's object instruction into his methodology. His objects, however, were quite different from those which Pestalozzi employed. Pestalozzi had used a variety of objects and expected children to exercise their sensory powers while, at the same time, becoming acquainted with them. Froebel's "gifts and occupations"²⁴, as he called

23. Ibid., P.7.

24. Ibid., P.285 ff.

them, were more limited in range. Furthermore, they had a certain formal quality about them, a quality which was meant, not so much to give immediate knowledge as a more remote, symbolic knowledge. The ball, for example, was to suggest a divine, all-inclusive unity.

Two final and important points in Froebel's educational philosophy deserve mention. The first is his idea of freedom. Rousseau had enunciated the principle that man is born free. Froebel thought that freedom is something that must be achieved through self-activity. Man, therefore, is not born free but is born with the potentiality for attaining freedom through his own activity. The second point is Froebel's idea of "reconciliation of opposites". All learning (and progress), according to him, occurs through the reconciliation of opposites. Hence, among his objects he had a cube and a cylinder, the cube being the opposite to the ball, and the cylinder mediating between the two. This latter idea Froebel seems to have adopted from Hegel.

Before dealing with Hegel, however, the educational philosophy of Tolstoy deserves mention. Tolstoy largely accepted Rousseau's idea of 'return to nature' but modified it to a 'return to the simple life of the peasant'. Both men questioned the benefits of civilization, but Tolstoy did not advocate a withdrawal of the student from

society. His 'Yasnaya Polyana' was a scene of (group) activity. He believed that the simple life of the peasant is less contaminated by civilization. He also thought that the child is nearer perfection than the adult. Our goal in education, therefore, lies behind us and not ahead. He writes:

To teach and educate the child is impossible and senseless on the simple ground that the child stands nearer than I do, nearer than any adult does, to that ideal of harmony, truth, beauty and goodness to which, in my pride, I wish to lead him.²⁵

The purpose of education, then, is to aid the child to maintain an inner harmony in spite of the world.

Tolstoy advocated an educational program which is centered on practical studies. The school should, therefore, be concerned with the present only. Unnecessary knowledge should not be memorized.

Why study about all the lands. The coachman will take you where you want to go.....What is the good of knowing the position of the river and city of Barcelona when, after having lived thirty-three years I have not once needed that knowledge.²⁶

Freedom of activity and from compulsion are absolutely necessary.

Remaining faithful to my principle, I never compelled the boy to learn the alphabet when he did not want to, or the adult to learn physics

25. Count Leo Tolstoy: "Who Should Learn From Whom?" (From the Kelmscott Complete Works of Tolstoy.) Vol.XV. P.332. Quotation taken from thesis by Thomson, K.H.(1938). P.131.
25. Ibid., P.277. (Thomson's Thesis, P.135)

or drawing when he preferred the alphabet.
Each selected what he wanted.²⁷

Again he writes, "The employment of force is due to haste and lack of reverence for human nature."²⁸ The educator should not interfere with the work of nature.

Tolstoy's school practiced 'learning by doing' in the fullest sense. There was no formality, no memorization. A quotation will give a good indication of Tolstoy's procedure:

They bring nothing with them -- no books and no copy books. They are not required to study their lessons at home. Not only do they bring nothing in their hands but nothing in their heads either. The scholar is not obliged to remember today anything he may have learned the evening before. The thought about his approaching lesson does not disturb him. He brings only himself, his receptive nature, and the conviction that school today will be just as jolly as it was the day before.²⁹

Even Froebel's philosophy of freedom cannot go beyond Tolstoy in this respect.

Contributions of Idealists

Although activity education is tied closely with empiricism and naturalism, two idealists, Hegel and Herbart, made important contributions to activistic thinking. Hegel (1770-1831), who has already been mentioned in connection

27. Ibid., P.198. (Thomson's Thesis, P.144.)

28. Ibid., P.172. (Thomson's Thesis, P.136.)

29. Ibid., P.166. (Thomson's Thesis, P.92.)

with Froebel, believed that progress results from a continual reconciliation of opposites. The opposites are thesis and antithesis, and the resulting reconciliation is synthesis. A continued reconciliation results in self-realization which, in turn, keeps parallel with the absolute mind or spirit which is continually evolving or realizing itself.

In the school one begins with the thesis that the child begins life in bondage to nature, that is, he is a creature of sense, feeling, and impulse. The opposite, or antithesis, is a life of pure objective mind. To reconcile these two opposites, that is, to reach a synthesis, the child must break loose from its bondage to nature. The break, or estrangement, is made during adolescence, when the child begins to realize the inadequacy of all that is merely subjective and individual. He begins to search for what is universal in life. The school provides a social atmosphere which aids self-realization, or the achievement of the universal. The theory of reconciliation implies constant reconstruction, continual re-solving of problems, and thus continued development or growth. Although progressive education is not based on idealism the close relationship of reconciliation to problem solving is apparent.

Another reformer, Herbart (1776-1841), introduced a new idea of experience into educational thought. Hegel

contended that there must be experience in education, but that experience consisted of the mind's own activity; that is; thinking is not conditioned by, or obstructed by anything. Mind is entirely independent. Herbart rejected this theory and insisted that experience consists of some kind of interaction.

According to Herbart Reality is composed of a plurality of independent reals, akin to the monads of Leibnitz. Contact and interaction between these different reals results in what we know as experience. The soul, he believed, is one real among many reals. Experience is merely a result of the contact between the soul as one real, and the other reals. By a careful choice of reals education can be regulated and controlled. There is a marked similarity between Herbart's type of experience and the interaction of which Dewey speaks.

Herbart's type of experience is more mechanical and deterministic than that recommended by Froebel. He would control educational outcomes by a careful choice of the reals presented; hence an emphasis on things external to the individual. Froebel's emphasis was on education from 'within out'. Herbart's emphasis is on external reals, or from 'without in'.

From his idea of a plurality of independent reals Herbart developed his theory of apperception, and his five steps. The effects of reactions between reals remain in

experience as ideas. These ideas determine the way we maintain ourselves when we come in contact with later reals, hence it is important to present reals that are agreeable. This process Herbart calls apperception; the sum of the ideas present in the mind he calls the apperceptive mass.

Mental life, according to Herbart, consists of an ebb and flow of ideas. One group of ideas endeavors to dominate over another, so that the different ideas have various degrees of vividness in the apperceptive mass. Some ideas sink below the level of consciousness. Moreover, ideas present in the apperceptive mass continually rise or sink as further experiences occur. It is the teacher's business to help the desired ideas to emerge, to remain, or to become strengthened. Hence there must be a continual reinforcement, continual activity. Although Herbart has mental activity in mind, it is significant that he puts great stress on activity, and because of his emphasis on activity he has something in common with the promoters of activism.

Comenius, Pestalozzi, and others had been concerned with conceptualization. It is evident from what has so far been said that Herbart is in turn concerned with the movement from one concept to another, with the interconnectedness of concepts. Here Herbart makes a unique contribution to educational thought. A continual movement from one

concept to another implies that there is an interconnection of concepts, and hence a stream of consciousness. This at once explodes the old faculty theory. It emphasizes the idea of wholeness, shows that education is an experiential process, and that there is an interconnection or continuity in the educational life of the learner.

Activism in America

Up to the nineteenth century (in fact the middle of the nineteenth century) the most important work in the field of education was done in Europe. From then on, however, the American continent was destined to produce its share of reformers, and its share of progressive ideas. The work at first was imitative, of course, but the imitation became more and more emphatic on certain principles, and finally new ideas were added to the existing fund.

Names associated with early ideas of activism in America are Samuel Read Hall, Bronson Alcott, and David P. Page. All these men were influential in American educational circles during the first half of the nineteenth century. All three believed in the need for activistic education.

Hall contended that learning should be accompanied by pleasure. "The first object at which you should aim (in teaching little children) is to please them---to make

the school as pleasant to them as possible."³⁰ He also favored practical instruction as can be gathered from the statement that the purpose of education is "to teach how to think and how to act in all the vicissitudes of life"³¹. In short, Hall favored instrumentalism.

Bronson Alcott followed similar procedures. He had much in common with Pestalozzi and believed that the school should be ruled by love rather than by fear. The pupil, he thought, should actively participate in the educational procedure rather than memorize and recite. Interest, understanding, and self-government in the school are also advised.

Page also entertained the idea that knowledge should be instrumental. He did not consider knowledge to be an end, but "ever an incident of true education"³². It is only a means to development, he thought. The pupil should not be a passive recipient, but should be encouraged to observe and discover things for himself. Page would thus develop self-reliance in the pupil.

Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbart, all had followers in the United States. The Pestalozzian method received its major spurt with the establishment of the Oswego Normal School in New York. This school made Pestalozzianism

30. Hall, Samuel Read: "Lectures on School Keeping".
Quotation taken from "Thirty-Third Yearbook", N.S.S.E.,
Part 2. (Public School Publishing Company) P.19.

31. Ibid., P.18.

32. Quotation taken from "Thirty-Third Yearbook", P.23.

a vogue. It became known as the "Oswego Movement". Prospective teachers came to it from far and near and carried the new ideas to all parts of the country. Educational museums were established and new educational techniques were propagated. Field trips and shop work were carried on. (The latter had been an innovation of Fellenberg, another Swiss educator.)

Froebelian ideas were introduced into the United States by German immigrants who were dissatisfied with the results of the revolution of 1848. After the Civil War William T. Harris was largely instrumental in introducing kindergartens into the United States. He was a great admirer of activism. In 1878-9 he wrote,

It is always the desideratum to secure the maximum of self-activity in the pupil. The kindergarten gifts are the best ever devised for the purpose of educating children through self-activity.³³

He also supported Froebel's symbolism, saying,

The symbolism involved in all things--- for in nature everything corresponds to spirit, and hence each lower material object is in some sense a key to unlock the perception of a higher, more subtle object--- this symbolism is the basis of the intellectual value of the gifts of Froebel.³⁴

These statements would indicate an almost complete acceptance of Froebel's philosophy. A similar attitude was taken

33. Ibid., P.26.

34. Ibid., P.27.

by Susan Blow, who opened the first permanent kindergarten in the United States. She had been preceded by Miss Peabody, who opened a training school for kindergartners in Boston, in 1868.

The self-activity movement received a great stimulus through the work of Col. Francis Parker, who was a great admirer of both Pestalozzi and Froebel. He became the most outspoken advocate of motor expression at all levels of the elementary school, not merely the pre-primary. He did not limit himself to formal and symbolic self-expression, as Froebel had done, but developed self-expression on its own account in a variety of forms, such as music, drawing, modelling, painting, and in speech. As a consequence of these activities we find that, by the twentieth century, a 'Progressive Movement' had come into existence, and that terms such as 'activity school', 'child activity', and 'activity curriculum' were common.

Froebel's theory of centering the educator's attention on the child received further reinforcements from the new dynamic concepts of psychology. The instinct psychology of William James and Edward Lee Thorndike, for example, gave a great impetus to educational methods predicated on native drives. The theory of psychoanalysis put forward by Freud also had important implications. He claimed that much mental ill health results from thwarting the instincts or native drives of children. This implies

a need for a freer rein of natural drives if education is to promote all-round development.

All the foregoing ideas are essential to a philosophy of wholeness such as progressive education purports to stand for. If education is to be predicated on the development of the child, on every aspect of his development, and on his needs, capacities, and interests, his emotional, physical, and social nurture is just as necessary as his intellectual. It remained for Dewey to seize upon the ideas of all the great educators preceding him, to fuse them together, and to give them a new perspective, in a new dynamic philosophy of education.

Dewey drew from the ideas of still other men, especially from such philosophers as Heraclitus, Hume, and Darwin. Heraclitus, for example, believed that everything in the world is in continual motion; that things are always changing; that there is no stability or finality. Hume refused to accept anything as true that cannot be perceived through the senses, not even such commonly accepted notions as causation. Darwin, who probably had more influence on Dewey than any other philosopher, contended that human intelligence is not a primordial thing but that it is itself a product of evolution; that it emerged from a process of being forced to make continual readjustments to a precarious environment. This implies that mind is relatively a late comer on the world scene.

On the foregoing basis Dewey worked out a philosophy of experience. Dewey does not accept any beliefs as final; they are all fallible according to him. There can be no finality if the world is in a continual flux; and flux, change, and novelty are accepted as applicable to the world and the nature of things. Dewey gives no place to transcendental truths in his philosophy. Ideas are accepted only if they make a practical difference; hence his philosophy is often known as pragmatism. All this implies an activity method in education. Truths are good only for a given time and a given place; hence continual reconstruction is necessary. Ideas need continual restatement.

Earlier philosophers had looked behind the experience of change for some remote cause. Plato saw behind change an underlying reality that never changes. Aristotle conceded the reality of change, but confined it to change within matter only; he contended that forms are eternal. Darwin exploded this theory in his "Origin of Species", wherein he conceives of change as being all-pervasive. Darwin found that there is a development of species as well as a development within species. To Dewey such a continuity or stream of development implies a stream of experience. It means continual growth and education, he believes, is all one with growth. Growth is not subordinate to anything but more growth, and education is not subordinate

to anything but more education. "Every experience lives on in further experiences"³⁵, that is, education is a continual reconstruction of experience. It is not a preparation of life but life itself. Dewey does not believe that progress is automatic; it is contingent on human effort; on the exercise of human intelligence; in short, on experience. (We have here a similarity to Froebel's idea of the creativeness of man.) Dewey would also cultivate individual differences. (Here again there is a similarity to Froebel who would not restrain spontaneous activity in order to force conformity. Froebel thought that there is uniformity in diversity.)

Dewey has no sympathy with traditional methods of teaching, with bookishness, passiveness on the part of the learner, and concentration on mental education. Such "methods of learning are foreign to the existing capacities of the young"³⁶. He would loosen all education from traditional prejudices. His problem method, which is intended to do away with traditional practices, is based on the immediate needs and interests of the pupils. "The problem method is expected to develop in the child the ability to meet new situations, to attack problems which constantly crop up in life, to make the adjustments necessary in a changing economic, social, and political order."³⁷

35. Dewey, John, "Experience and Education", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1939). P.16.

36. Ibid., P.4.

37. Demashkevich, Michael: "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education" (American Book Company - 1935). Chap.III, P.119.

It must arise out of their present needs because their needs change all the time. Furthermore, the needs of different pupils are different. The solution to the problem must fulfil the desires as well as the needs of the pupils; it must give them satisfaction as well as training. The inner self is thus also developing harmoniously; thus fulfilling the needs of all-round development.

The activities must arise out of everyday life situations; they must be typical of activities prevailing in the everyday environment. They must be "transactions between the individual and what at the time constitutes his environment"³⁸. Nothing should be presented because it is thought to be "intrinsically cultural or intrinsically good"³⁹. Things or objects chosen to work with must be chosen according to the needs and the pupils must have a voice in their choice. "The natural impulses constitute the starting point."⁴⁰ the objects are part of what Dewey calls "objective conditions".⁴¹ Experience, incidentally, implies at least some interaction between these "objective conditions" (the non-human element in the environment) and the individuals taught; that is, at least some overt doing is thought to be essential. Things

38. Dewey, P.41.

39. Ibid., P.46.

40. Ibid., P.74.

41. Ibid., P.43.

do not go on "just inside the head"⁴². The idea of self-activity, or sense-experience, has thus reached a final purpose in the philosophy of education---to ascertain what is truth, or what is knowledge.

Summary

'Learning by Doing', in practice, is as old as the history of education. As a theory it dates back to the time of Aristotle. According to him, interaction with one's environment is necessary in order to understand it. He believed that the mental and physical aspects of one's being function together and that, therefore, both aspects should receive due consideration from the educator.

As history progresses sense experience is urged upon the educator for more and more reasons: for its practical value by Quintilian, Rabelais and Montaigne; for cognitive purposes by Comenius, Locke, Pestalozzi and others; by Bacon to discover knowledge (knowledge that "is"); by Rousseau to satisfy the feelings and emotions as well as to promote all-round development; by Froebel to give vent to the child's creative instinct and, finally, by Dewey (who includes all of the above) to determine what is truth---pragmatic truth. Bacon had employed the senses to search out knowledge that "is", knowledge that

42. Dewey, John: "Democracy and Education", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1920.) P.321.

is certain and that is to be accepted as true if only the senses can grasp it effectively. He did not believe that erroneous concepts are results of the invalidity of knowledge but are rather results of the improper perception of it. Dewey adds the climax to the theory of sense perception by asserting that no knowledge is permanent and that, therefore, a final function of sense experience (together with thought experience) is to determine what is acceptable as truth, and only that is acceptable which promises the greatest practical effect.

As a result of the general approval which it has received, and of the many arguments which have been advanced in its favor, activity education has become firmly entrenched in schools all across the North American Continent. Because of its general application to educational procedure another aspect of progressive education is receiving much attention, namely, the idea that education should take place in a social setting. That aspect of progressivism is treated in the next chapter.

SOURCES OF DEWEY'S THOUGHT

SOURCES	DEWEY
Heraclitus: Change is continual. Darwin: change is continual; all-pervasive; developmental.	Change is continual; there is no finality; no ultimate truth.
Hume: No knowledge is acceptable that is not the result of sense experience.	Truth comes through experience; hence education must be predicated on experience.
Montaigne: Take course which promises the greatest human effect. Rabelais: Test knowledge before accepting it. James: Truth is that which works.	Truth (and course of action) should be established pragmatically. Knowledge should be a guide for action.
Bacon: Man must free himself from the four 'idols'. Rousseau: Return to nature; free inquiry. Locke: Get away from tradition. Spencer: Get away from the traditional; the ornamental.	Man must be free from authority, tradition; transcendentalism, in order to make unbiased judgment.
Darwin: Mind is a product of evolution; is not transcendental; but rather the product of experience; the result of continual readjustment. James: Truth must be determined; is not transcendental. This implies a need for exercising the judging powers of the learner.	Experience implies sense impressions for training of the judgment so that it can determine what is 'truth'.
Rabelais: Study things. Montaigne: Study things. Bacon: Go to nature. Rousseau: Three educators—nature, men and things. Pestalozzi: Co-operate with nature; object lessons; activities typical of life. Froebel: Gifts and occupations.	Experience implies contact with the environment, with the human and non-human (objective) element—hence 'nature, men, things'.

SOURCES

Aristotle: Sense perception for cognition.
 Bacon: Sense perception for cognition; to ascertain the validity of knowledge; to discover knowledge.
 Comenius: Sense perception for cognition, to form clear concepts.
 Locke: Sense perception for cognition.
 Rousseau: Sense perception for:
 (a) cognition.
 (b) training senses for better perception.
 (c) for mere enjoyment (outlet for emotions and feelings).
 (d) for all-round development.

Herbart: Experience is an interaction of 'reals'.

Herbart: Education can be controlled by choice of 'reals'.

Pestalozzi: Pupils should handle a variety of objects of a type common in actual life.
 Rousseau: Objects as met with incidentally.

Hegel: Reconciliation leads to growth.
 Locke: Education develops power.
 Darwin: Evolution is developmental.
 Pestalozzi: Education is development.
 Froebel: Education is unfoldment.
 Rousseau: Education is development according to nature.

DEWEY

Experience implies sense perception for:

- (a) cognition.
- (b) training senses for better perception.
- (c) for mere enjoyment; developing emotional stability.
- (d) giving vent to creative urge of child.

Experience implies interaction; it involves 'doing'.

Experience can be controlled through choice of 'objective conditions'.

Objects must be of a wide variety, chosen together with the pupils.

Continual change means continual growth. Growth is one with experience and with education.

SOURCES

Hegel: Continued reconciliation (reconstruction) implies continued activity.

Herbart: An interconnection of concepts gives rise to a stream of consciousness; to continuity.

Hegel: Mind is predicated on nothing but its own experiencing.

Bacon: Knowledge comes from intentional discovery; must be purposive; scientific.

Hegel: Reconciliation of opposites:

- (a) Thesis
- (b) Antithesis
- (c) Synthesis.

Aristotle: 'Doing leads to interest—to more doing—to growth.

Pestalozzi: Actual life occupations promote growth.

Froebel: Natural activities provide outlet for creative urge; for spontaneous play. A divine unity pervades all activities.

Rabelais: Connect learning, education, with life.

Pestalozzi: Activities typical of life.

Rousseau: Emile studies things as presented by nature (incidentally).

DEWEY

There must be continual reconstruction; a stream of experience. One experience gives rise to another.

Education is not subordinate to anything but more education, experience to more experience; growth to more growth.

Progress and growth are not automatic, but contingent on experience; on overcoming obstructions.

The 'problem' method implies an obstruction; needs a solution.

The 'problem' method provides outlet for spontaneous activity; for originality. It promotes all-round development; makes room for individual differences.

Activities must be typical of actual life.

SOURCES

Aristotle: Soul is active; urges on.

Comenius: Children are active; want to do.

Rousseau: Children are active; want to change things.

Froebel: Children are curious, restless; have an urge to create.

Freud-James: Human drives are important factors in education; they must have outlets.

DEWEY

The interests of the child, his aspirations, his urge to 'do' and to create must be considered by the educator. They are important in the all-round development of the learner.

C H A P T E R I V

EDUCATION IN A SOCIAL MILIEU

The Problem

The foregoing chapter dealt with the growing belief that education should be an active process. In more recent times another belief has been commonly associated with that of activity, namely, that educational activity should take place in a social medium. Education in a social medium is expected to achieve several different results. For one thing, it is held that education in a social setting introduces the child naturally into an important part of his environment--- society. It gives the student actual experience in group living. The student realizes, in early life, his dependence on others for his welfare; he becomes aware that there is an interdependence of members in a society.

An awareness of interdependence leads to co-operative effort in solving common problems. This gives the students practice in the type of problem solving they will encounter in later life. Not only do they gain valuable experience but a social consciousness develops -- pupils become social minded. Such group concern by individual members is essential in a democracy. Social education thus gives practice in democratic living.

It is further believed that group activities help to break down social stratification. The group has common interests which serve as bonds of unity. If such common interests are brought into existence early in life, prejudices have not had time to take root, and social contact with varied members of the group will reduce the probability of such prejudices taking root. The possibility of a harmonious society is increased.

The theory that society and the individual are one, and that education and growth are one, implies that development of the individual and the social group must go on simultaneously. In a changing society continual re-adjustment is necessary. The student should therefore be placed in a social environment where he must continually re-adjust himself socially.

Finally, if education is to be true to life a variety of elements must enter into the process -- a variety of individuals, a variety of things, and a variety of activities. Such a situation can only be found in a homogeneous group comprised of heterogeneous components. As Dewey says, the school should be a "miniature society"¹. All activities in the school should be closely related to

1. John Dewey, "The School and Society" (University of Chicago Press) P.15.

what goes on in actual life outside the school. Only then do students get actual life experiences.

Growth of the Concept

In a sense a social medium came into existence (educationally speaking) when first a number of children were brought together for the purpose of instruction. It did not mean that there was conscious social training, however. When we consider ancient Sparta we find that the case is different. Regimentation was considered all-important, so group unity and group consciousness was a definite goal of education. The boy, after the sixth year, grew up in public barracks. He ate there, slept there, and "mastered the skills and the attitudes required of all the Spartans"². He lived with the group until he reached adulthood himself.

Aristotle held that public education is better than education by a private tutor. In his "Politics" he says,

And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private -- not as at present, when everyone looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all.³

2. Brubacher, J.S. "A History of the Problems of Education" (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.) P.536.

3. Aristotle, "Politics", Trans. by Benjamin Jowett (Oxford--Clarendon Press) Bk.VIII, P.300.

Private education, Aristotle thinks, does not produce social consciousness.

The Roman boy often accompanied his father to the forum, the camp and the field. Thus he learned the virtues of fortitude, earnestness, prudence, piety, and other virtues demanded by his social environment, not by precept, but by observing them in his father and in his father's associates, that is, from social experiences. Quintilian, a Roman teacher, favored public as against private education. He rejected the idea that morals are contaminated at school. He believed, as Cicero did before him, that the orator should be a well-rounded man of affairs and not just a good speaker. He needs a broad outlook and hence an all-round education. He recommended play, games and amusements as procedures conducive to an all-round education.

In the sixteenth century we find Montaigne (1533-1592) advocating travel as being conducive to education. He does not favor class instruction, however. He writes,

When, according to our custom, a teacher undertakes, in one and the same lesson, and with one measure of guidance, to train many minds differing so largely in kind and capacity, it is no wonder if, in a whole multitude of children, he hardly comes upon two or three who can reap any real benefit from their teaching.⁴

Montaigne would make certain that his student becomes well-acquainted with the world around him, however. To quote

4. Montaigne: "The Essays of Montaigne", Trans. by E.J. Trenchmann (Oxford University Press) Vol.1, P.148.

him again:

To this end, human intercourse is marvellously well adapted, as well as travel in foreign countries, not after the manner of our French nobles, merely to report on how many paces the Santa Rotonda measures, or on the richness of Signora Livia's drawers; or, like some others, how much longer or broader the face of Nero is in some old ruin of that city than that on some similar medallion; but to report chiefly on the intellectual characteristics and the manners of those nations, and to rub and file our brains in contact with those of others.⁵

In another passage he says,

Mixing with society has a marvellous effect in clearing up a man's judgement. We are all compressed and heaped up within ourselves, and our sight is shortened to the length of our noses. Someone asked Socrates whence he was. He did not answer 'Of Athens', but, 'Of the world'. He, whose imagination was fuller and wider, embraced the universe as his city, extended his acquaintance, his society, and his affection all over mankind.⁶

It is evident that Montaigne thinks a social environment for the learner is desirable. It is evident also that Montaigne believes the learner should get social experience rather than ornamental knowledge from his travels.

Bacon (1561-1626) also advised travel for the student. A quotation from his essay "Of Travel" will clarify his position.

Travel, in the younger sort, is a part of education; in the elder a part of experience. He that travelleth into a country before he

5. Ibid., P.151.

6. Ibid., P.156.

hath some entrance into the language,
goeth to school, and not to travel.⁷

While Bacon suggests travel as a necessary part to round out one's general education he puts particular stress upon the social experiences. He writes,

Things to be seen and observed are: the courts of princes, especially when they give audience to ambassadors, the courts of justice, while they sit and hear causes, and so of consistories ecclesiastic; the churches and monasteries.⁸

Again he says,

Let him see and visit eminent persons in all kins, which are of great name abroad, that he may be able to tell how the life agreeth with the fame.⁹

When he returns the traveller is advised not to "leave the countries altogether behind him, but maintain a correspondence by letters with those of his acquaintance which are of most worth".¹⁰ It is of some significance that Bacon suggests visiting the courts of princes "when they give audience to ambassadors" and courts of justice while they are in session. The social situation is more real.

Locke (1632-1704) considered travel to be necessary to round out the education of the "gentleman"; "to finish

7. Bacon, Francis; "Essays (Of Travel)" in "Harvard Classics" -- Milton's Prose, Thomas Browne, (P.F. Collier & Son, New York, 1909.) Essay No. XVIII, P.48.

8. Ibid., P.49.

9. Ibid., P.50.

10. Ibid.

the work and complete the Gentleman"¹¹. Travel, he thought, helps to introduce him into the society in which he will live, and to acquaint him with the customs of the group; "the Customs and Ways of Living, different from one another, and especially from those of his Parish and Neighborhood"¹². Locke also saw a danger of the boy developing shyness at home and conceded that he develops a certain sturdiness if he is in association with other boys away from home.

In Germany Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) favored sending children to school and educating them in a social atmosphere. Private education, he thought, fosters the home's shortcomings. Education in a group away from home gives the child the opportunity to measure his powers against those of his fellows. Kant also held that "habits of citizenship are cultivated by the child's learning the limitations which the rights of his school-mates impose upon him"¹³. This is a modern concept.

Hegel (1770-1831) also advised the educator not to place too high a value on individuality. He thought the educator should seek the law and order of universal reason. In the school the learner begins to make adjustments.

11. Locke, John: "Some Thoughts Concerning Education" (Cambridge University Press, 1927). P.184.

12. Ibid.

13. Brubacher, P.540.

He begins to give up that which is peculiarly his own and to take on that which is common. He thus gave emphasis to the social element in the educative process.

The Experimentalists

In the field of practical work we might begin with Basedow (1723-1790). In his *Philanthropinum* the student was not as docile as most other students of the time were. Not only were activity and variety introduced into school life, as mentioned in the previous chapter, but the students carried on certain activities together. The languages, French and Latin, were taught by conversation. Games were introduced to make learning interesting. A description by Herr Schummel in "Fred's Journey to Dessau" gives us a good idea of the social atmosphere which prevailed in Basedow's school. He says,

Another game, 'the hiding game', I will also teach you. Someone writes a name, and hides it from the children--the name of some part of the body, or of a plant, or animal, or metal--and the children guess what it is. Whoever guesses right gets an apple or a piece of cake. One of the visitors wrote 'Intestina' and told the children it was a part of the body. Then the guessing began. One guessed caput, another nasus, another os, another manus, pes, digiti, pectus, and so forth, for a long time; but one of them hit it at last.¹⁴

14. Quick, Robert H. "Essays on Educational Reformers" (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1895). P.283.

Another instance will suggest the co-operative aspect of the school even more.

He (Herr Wolke)* asked the children what he should draw. Someone answered leonem. He then pretended he was drawing a lion, but put a beak to it, whereupon the children shouted Non est leo--leones non habent rostrum. He went on to the other subjects as the children directed him, sometimes going wrong that the children might put him right.¹⁵

These activities indicate that the group was allowed to express itself and to have a voice in the activities carried on.

The Infant Schools of Robert Owen also deserve mention. They were introduced in New Lanark, Scotland, about 1799. In 1818 they were carried to London by James Buchanan, a teacher of Owen's school. They were established specifically for the children of parents who worked in the factories all day. Religion and the three R's formed much of the programme, but since many of the children were very young (seven years and under), considerable attention was given to directed play. Dancing and singing were common activities, and nursery care was provided for the children. Natural objects were given preference to books.

Socialized activities were first given a thorough trial on a scale by Pestalozzi (1746-1827). In his schools

15. Ibid., P.284.

*Words in brackets my own.

The children actually lived together; they shared both their joys and their privations. Pestalozzi treated the children as his own. At Neuhof he began with only about twenty-five children, but the number was later increased. They worked together (with Pestalozzi); in the summer they worked in the garden and in the fields, in the winter they worked in the house. Manual work, such as that experienced in actual life (like spinning) was introduced. "He took as his starting point the needs, desires and connexions of actual life."¹⁶ In a letter to his friend Gessner, Pestalozzi outlines his aim:

I wanted to prove by experiment that if education is to have any real value for humanity, it must imitate the means which make the merit of domestic education; for it is my opinion that if school teaching does not take into consideration the circumstances of family life, and everything else that bears on a man's general education, it can only lead to an artificial and methodical dwarfing of humanity.¹⁷

His next experiment at Stanz was performed on a larger scale but under the most dire circumstances. He had nearly eighty children but they all learned to share the little they had. Pestalozzi in his letter to Gessner says:

We wept and smiled together. They forgot the world and Stanz; they knew only that they were with me and I with them. We shared our

16. Quick, P.314.

17. Ibid., P.321.

food and drink. I had about me neither family, friends, nor servants; nothing but them.¹⁸

Again he says,

My one aim was to make their new life in common, and their new powers awaken a feeling of brotherhood amongst the children, and make them affectionate, just and considerate.¹⁹

The results were most encouraging.

When the neighboring town of Altdorf was burnt down, I gathered the children around me and said, 'Altdorf has been burnt down; perhaps at this very moment, there are a hundred children there without home, food, or clothes; will you not ask our good Government to let twenty of them come and live with us?' I still seem to see the emotion with which they answered, 'Oh, yes, yes!' 'But my children,' I said, 'think well of what you are asking! Even now we have scarcely money enough, and it is not at all certain that if these poor children come to us, the Government would give us any more than they do at present, so that you might have to work harder, and share your clothes with these children, and sometimes perhaps go without food. Do not say, then, that you would like them to come unless you are quite prepared for all these consequences.' After having spoken to them in this way as seriously as I could, I made them repeat all I had said, to be quite sure they had thoroughly understood what the consequences of their request would be. But they were not in the least shaken in their decision, and all repeated, 'Yes, yes, we are quite ready to work harder, eat less, and share our clothes, for we want them to come'.²⁰

The social spirit of Pestalozzi's pupils is evident.

18. Ibid., P.322.

19. Ibid., P.324.

20. Quick, P.326.

Philipp Emanuel von Fellenberg (1771-1884), a Swiss nobleman, became an ardent exponent of Pestalozzian principles. He is particularly remembered for introducing manual work in his schools. Trades and agriculture were taught first-hand in his institution. He believed that the shop and the farm are ideal environments for education. In undertakings of such a nature group work was naturally carried on.

Froebel (1782-1852), who made significant contributions to educational thought, established the kindergarten, in which the children formed a miniature society. Froebel's philosophy led him to believe that there is an inner unity among all things (inorganic, organic and spiritual); that there is an interconnectedness between them. The individual is one with the race; one with society. They form one organic life, which the school should reflect.

The school thus becomes an association for the child wherein he discovers in a simplified and idealized form all the relations of society. The true foundation of the school as a means of social progress as well as the instrument of individual development is thus revealed.²¹

As pointed out in the preceding chapter, education in Froebel's kindergarten centered largely around play. Froebel ascribed great significance to play as a means to unfoldment. The little children thus shared and co-operated

21. Monroe, Paul, "Brief Course in the History of Education", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1911). P.333.

in their activities. Monroe gives Froebel credit for fully employing the method of socialized instruction.

He explains:

It is with Froebel that the full social significance of the subject-matter of instruction, as the presentation to the child of the simplified and idealized elements of his own life's environment, is fully grasped. As an epitome of life, the curriculum becomes the initial point of all instruction. This conception gives education a wholly new significance, and that a social one. It is the working out of this conception that forms the chief concern of education today. While it is the psychological aspect of the problem that first received chief recognition during the present generation, it is Froebel's pedagogical thought, as it is more fully appreciated that has come to have a new significance. No phase of school work has so closely approximated the idea of a society in a microcosm as has the kindergarten.²²

Before leaving Froebel it seems appropriate to let him give some of his views himself. In a letter to Miss Howe he writes,

The present condition of our social life, in all its varied grades, first demands, however, if we are to attain an earlier and better training for children, a much more complete training for their mothers and outside helpers, in the shape of children's nurses, nursery governesses and teachers. Whatever is itself perfect and vigorous will produce what is perfect and vigorous in its turn. But such a result can only be attained by associated work; just as in the education of numbers of children alternately with the quiet of home training.²³

22. Ibid., P.371.

23. Thatcher, Oliver J. Editor-in-Chief, "The Library of Original Sources", (University Research, Extension Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin), Vol.IX, P.405.

The need for training children in association with one another is absolute, Froebel thinks.

Another excerpt will amplify his viewpoint:

But, since children to quite a peculiar degree educate one another, mutually, if meeting together for associated play, under proper guidance and suggestive influence we....need establishments for training quite young children, in their first stage of educational development, where their training and instructions shall be based upon their own free action or spontaneity, acting under proper rules; these rules not being arbitrarily decreed, but such as must arise by logical necessity from the child's mental and bodily nature, regarding him as the member of the great human family; such rules as are, in fact, discovered by the actual observation of children when associated together in companies. These establishments bear the name of Kindergartens, of 'Gardens of Children', a name expressing both their aims and their methods of working.²⁴

Socialized instruction was introduced in America largely by the same people who introduced the theory of activism on this continent. The Oswego Movement, which has already been mentioned (in the foregoing chapter), fostered Pestalozzianism and hence socialized activities. It was given impetus by Edward A. Sheldon, who introduced the idea at Oswego. Activities were extended to include field trips and shopwork, activities in which group work is implicit.

Pestalozzianism and Froebelianism were both given active support by Col. Francis Parker. The kindergarten

24. Ibid.

(Froebelianism) became popular in the United States after the Civil War. The first ones were set up under private auspices. In 1876 kindergarten materials were exhibited at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia, which gave a stimulus to the movement. The first public kindergarten was set up in Boston, but it did not survive. Susan Blow (1843-1916) established the first permanent kindergarten in St. Louis. Miss Blow followed Froebel's pedagogy very closely and even injected his symbolism into her methods. Socialized education thus began to take root in America.

After 1900 the Froebelians became divided. One camp, that which followed Susan Blow, was orthodox and upheld Froebel's symbolism. The other followed Patty Smith Hill (1868-1946) and Alice Temple (1866---) who restated Froebel's principles. Both women were influenced by the philosophies of John Dewey and of G. Stanley Hall. They discarded Froebel's symbolism and conducted kindergartens where activities---such as games, songs, and art activities---were carried on and enjoyed for their own sake. The social situation in their schools was even more real than that of previous Froebelian schools because the activities were disconnected from all transcendental and mystic concepts.

The nursery school which made its appearance in America early in the twentieth century also reflects the

growth of socialized activities in education. It concerned itself with providing educational activities for children of prekindergarten age. The program consisted largely of free play activities. It also gave close attention to the formation of good habits and attitudes in the very early years of the child's life.

The man who is especially insistent upon a social milieu in the educative process is John Dewey. To him society and the individual are one. The educational process and the social process are also closely related because both are based on communication between individuals. A society is good or bad according to the degree of harmony that exists between the members, and the facility with which the members share the fruits of their culture.

Dewey does not lose sight of any of the advantages afforded by the 'social medium'. He believes, for one thing, that the experimental school should prepare students for future social living. He writes (of the experimental school),

In the theory of the school, the first factor in bringing about the desired co-ordination was the establishment of the school as itself a form of community life. It was thought that education could prepare the young for future social life only when the school was itself a co-operative society on a small scale. The integration of the individual and the social is impossible except when the individual lives in close association with others in the constant and free give-and-take

of experience, and finds his happiness and growth in the process of sharing them.²⁵

Dewey thought Pestalozzi's greatest contribution to education was his conception of education as "social development"²⁶, derived from "participating intimately and actively in activities of social life"²⁷. He thought Pestalozzi weakened his position as an educator in his later years because he emphasized "presentation of objects by the teacher"²⁸, rather than "growth by means of personal activities"²⁹.

Socialized activities, according to Dewey, tend to wear down social stratification.

It is the office of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born and to come into living contact with a broader environment.³⁰

In discussing Mr. Valentine's experiment with colored children (in Schools of Tomorrow) he suggests, "Yet the success of the experiment would mean a real step forward in solving the 'race question' and peculiar problems of any immigrant district as well"³¹. Thus Dewey suggests that the development of racial prejudices can be prevented.

Dewey holds that social education is conducive to good discipline. "Control of individual actions", he writes, "is effected by the whole situation in which the

25. From Mr. Dewey's statement in the history of the school, by Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Edwards. Quotation taken from "Thirty-Third Yearbook", Part II, N.S.S.E. P.35.

26. Dewey, John and Evelyn, "Schools of Tomorrow", (E.P.Dutton & Co.) P.62.

27. Ibid., P.63.

28. Ibid., P.65.


29. Ibid.

30. Dewey, John, "Democracy and Education" (The MacMillan Co., New York, 1920). P.24.

31. Dewey, John and Evelyn, "Schools of Tomorrow", P.207.

individuals are involved"³², and again, the activities must "create situations that of themselves tend to exercise control over what this, that, and the other pupil does, and how he does it"³³. Not only does control arise from the group activities, but such control is said to be more democratic.

It has already been stated that there should be a close relationship between the school and all parts of the environment. An isolated school cannot take adequate care of the pupils' educational needs. Activities in the school should be related to activities in the environment, and things in the vicinity such as business places, factories and educational institutions should be accessible to the students. In his book, "The School and Society", Dewey describes the ideal school situation, and explains it by the following charts:



32. Dewey, John, "Experience and Education", (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1939.) P.57.


33. Ibid., P.63.

34. Dewey, John, "The School and Society", (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois). Opposite P.66.

Chart 1 shows the general school environment. The school, as can be seen from Mr. Dewey's chart, is a part of the larger whole of social life. The arrows indicate the free interplay between the school and the other sections of society.


Dewey deplotes the waste which results in the school because the child is unable to use the experiences outside of school in any free way within the school. In his ideal set-up he proposes to bring opportunities into the school to provide for the free use of such experiences.

CHART 2³⁵



In Chart 2 the school building is organized and located so as to avoid isolation from other important parts of society. Activities which are carried on in the vicinity are brought into the school. The corners represent the practical, the centre, the theory of these activities. Not technical skill, but connection with social life is important. The practical also provides for the child's need for action. Ideas from the school can be carried over to the home, and vice versa. Thus the child "can come to school with all the experience he has got outside the school and.....leave it with something to be immediately used in his everyday life"³⁶.

CHART 3³⁷



36. Ibid., P.73.

37. Ibid., opposite P.76.

Chart 3 shows the upper story of the school. Here the questions arising in the kitchen and in the shop can be taken into the laboratories and be worked out. Ample scope is given to art and music which, when united with other schoolwork become richer and more vital. Dewey's charts show how completely he would integrate schoolwork with the general doings of society.

In concluding it seems in order to point out the adaptibility of Dewey's problem method of socialized instruction. To have a problem means that a student must sense a difficulty; an obstacle to an end he wishes to achieve. Dewey believes that the problem should be the basis of instruction. A problem can be encountered by an entire group just as readily as by an individual alone. The solution of the problem then becomes the concern of the entire group. Common planning and common effort is necessary to achieve a common end. Once a basis for common action is found, and once a united effort is put forth a real social situation has been effected.

Summary

The history of the concept dealt with in this chapter reveals that there is a movement towards an ever closer integration of school life and actual every day life. Early educators like Quintilian and Montaigne urged the

"mixing with society"³⁸ in order to round out the student's personality. Bacon and Locke advocated travel to acquaint the learner with the world. Kant and Hegel favored socialized education to foster "habits of citizenship"³⁹.

The most important contributions in connection with socialized education were made by the educators who carried on actual experiments. Basedow, Owen, Pestalozzi, Fellenberg and Froebel did such experimentation. In their schools the students carried on activities similar to those in their environments---spinning, sewing, gardening, dancing, singing, and the like. All these educators allowed their pupils the fullest measure of freedom in their social intercourse.

After the activity movement came to America social activity grew up along with educational activity. Col. Francis Parker, Susan Blow, Patty Smith Hill and Alice Temple each had a share in promoting the idea. It remained for Dewey, however, to give the idea a fuller meaning, and a more complete implementation. Dewey is socially conscious throughout his writings and offers suggestions for the closest possible integration of the school and society.

38. Supra, Chap. IV, P.125.

39. Ibid., P.127.

This concludes the historical survey of concepts basic to progressive education. The foregoing chapters have traced the general history of the basic concepts. We will next survey the growth of progressivism in a specific area, namely, Alberta. This survey follows in Chapter V.

CHAPTER V

ACTIVISM IN ALBERTA

A Brief History of Education in Alberta

Alberta began to operate its schools in 1905 on the basis of a traditional programme. Basic changes were slow in coming as the following brief history of education in Alberta will indicate:

The first school programme used in Alberta was drawn up in 1902 by Dr. D.J. Goggin, then Principal of Regina Normal School, and a member of the Council of Public Instruction for the North-West Territories. This programme covered the full range of our present (1937)* grades from I to XII, but was based on a system of eight "standards". Standards I to V covered the range from Grades I to VIII, and Standards VI, VII and VIII corresponded to our present Grades X, XI and XII. Dr. Goggin's system of standards was substantially the old Ontario system of five "classes" and five "readers" in the public school. Since that day there has been a very definite trend away from the practice of confining the child's reading within the covers of a single book. At first "supplementary readers" were added; and now we prescribe, not a single book, but a list of books---a classroom library, in other words---from which the pupils may choose their reading.

Although the old Territorial regime passed away in 1905, Dr. Goggin's school programme remained in the new Province of Alberta until 1912, when it was rewritten by a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. H.M. Tory, the first President of the University of Alberta. The most important change of that time was the substitution of "grades" for standards. It had been found that the average child could not complete the five "standards" of the public school programme in five years; but really requires eight years. Accordingly, eight "grades" were put in place of the five "standards", the achievement

*Figures in brackets my own.

required in each grade being approximately what the average child can accomplish in one year. Today, according to the latest Annual Report of the Department of Education, the modal age of children entering Grade I is, for the Province as a whole, 7 years, and the modal age in each successive grade increases by one year, being 14 years for Grade VIII, 15 years for Grade IX, and 18 years for Grade XII. Many children, of course, complete the programme in a much shorter time, but the new system of "a grade a year" was less likely than the old to induce a sense of failure in the child of average ability.

In 1922, an entirely new programme was introduced which had been drafted by a Curriculum Committee under the direction of our present Deputy Minister, Dr. McNally. This programme with some occasional refurbishing and revamping served until the year 1936. Thus there were but two changes in thirty years, and only one of these was fundamental.¹

Further clarification of the trend in Alberta school programmes is given in the 1939 Report of the Deputy Minister. It reads, in part,

The first major revision was undertaken in 1912 under the general chairmanship of Dr. H.M. Tory, President of the University of Alberta. As a result of the study made at that time, a system of twelve grades was introduced and provision made for the teaching of such "special" subjects as art, manual training, household economics and health.

At the close of the war (1914-1918)* it was felt that the new problems which had arisen demanded new emphases and new procedures. As a consequence, between 1921 and 1924 a complete rewriting of the curriculum from Grade I to Grade XII was undertaken, under the organization and direction of the present Deputy Minister.

1. Report of the Supervisor of Schools (Dr. H.C. Newland) in "Annual Report of the Department of Education 1937", P.15.

*Figures in brackets my own.

As was to be expected, this revision concerned itself almost entirely with a modernization of subject-matter in the basic courses, introduction of wider choices of subjects for students not destined for professional training, and provision for promotion by subject or unit.²

This second quotation amplifies the first in so far as it indicates more specifically what revisions were made. The introduction of 'special' subjects, for example, indicates that some form of activity was made available to the students at an early date. It is also of some significance that special consideration was given to 'students not destined for professional training'. It gives us some evidence that educators were becoming conscious of the need for adapting courses of study to the needs of pupils. It is the beginning of a trend away from a subject-centered curriculum.

The Growth of Activistic Thought in Alberta

Although the early courses of study were traditionalist in type, and although they gave emphasis to content, many of Alberta's early educators gave indications of a consciousness of the need for newer methods and for a newer approach. Nothing, perhaps, will give us a better picture of the stand of some of Alberta's earlier educators, and of the general trend in educational thought than a series

2. Report of the Deputy Minister, Dr. G. Fred McNally, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1939", P.7.

of excerpts from the reports of the various school inspectors. Some of the early inspectors give stress to "learning by doing" rather than by memorization, others emphasize the need for more play in the school, and still others want to see more evidence of socialized activities in the school. This does not mean that the demand for activism was unanimous. In keeping with the spirit of the courses of study close attention to the mastery of subject matter is evident in some of the reports. Demands are made for more uniform systems of promotion and for uniform examinations to prevent indiscriminate promotions. A close adherence to the course of studies receives favorable comment in not a few instances. Amidst these criticisms, however, there are also criticisms favoring more progressive procedures. The following series of excerpts will show a growing consciousness in evidence among Alberta educators to the need of a departure from the traditional programme.

Except in the short term school, the programme is being fairly well followed. There is still, however, a lack of systematic work in nature study, drawing and writing. There may be some excuse, perhaps, with some teachers for slighting nature study, but I can see no plausible reason for discarding drawing and writing, two subjects which more than any others illustrate the maxim "Learn by doing". In an age like the present when the child is so often judged by what he can do one would expect to see the teacher err in the other extreme.³

3. Report of Inspector G.E. Ellis, "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1908", P.41.

The work in the town and village schools is in general good in all subjects and the curriculum is being followed carefully, but in some of the schools the students in the higher grades are not kept acquainted with current events and a healthy spirit of inquiry in this respect is lacking.⁴

A worthy interest is taken in music, drawing, manual training, domestic science and physical culture in the city schools. Expert supervisors have charge of the work. It is unfortunate that the conservatism of tradition, or the lack of financial ability or both, is so long keeping manual training work from our town and rural schools. The training of the pupils in the correlate use of hand and eye in the manipulation of tools and materials gives them a remarkable readiness of adaptability in any field of activity where such skill is required.⁵

It is significant as to the educational value of gardening when so much interest is shown by the pupils and so little time taken from the regular school work. There is no doubt, however, that the time taken for this work is well spent. Speaking generally regarding gardening, I am of the opinion that in this inspectorate at the present time it is taken in hand rather for the pleasure it affords than for its pedagogical value.⁶

I have been struck by the almost entire absence of knowledge of any games among children in the rural schools.⁷

4. Report of Inspector John Ross, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1908", P.42.
5. Report of Inspector J.A. Smith, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1910", P.46.
6. Report of Inspector J.F. Boyce, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1910", P.49.
7. Report of Inspector G. Fred McNally, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1910", P.59.

Arithmetic continues to receive a large share of the time of both pupil and teacher. One weakness noted in connection with this subject is the failure to make it practical.⁸

A tribute should be paid those teachers who regard their work in the community as extending beyond the limits of the four walls of the school building and who are found among the leaders in every movement of a sociological and educational character.⁹

The development of the play spirit in the children of foreign schools produces a marked effect. The children become happy, frank and full of life and present a striking contrast to the listless, repressed spirits of those school children who have little or no knowledge of games.¹⁰

I found very few schools where any attempt was being made to organize play. At intermission the pupils are generally left to their own devices, and knowing few interesting games, indulge in silly talk or mere rough and tumble.¹¹

Too much emphasis is given to the teaching of formal grammar. Altogether too many teachers are emphasizing grammatical machinery to the serious loss of practical language teaching.¹²

The Public School Board (Calgary)* is experimenting with an elementary prevocational school in the Riverside Community, where the majority of pupils are children of foreign parentage.

8. Report of Inspector G. Fred McNally, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1911", P.54.

9. Ibid., P.55.

10. Report of Inspector Robert Fletcher, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1912", P.68.

11. Report of Inspector W.A. Stickle, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1915", P.120.

12. Report of Inspector J.A. Smith, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1917", P.49.

*Word in brackets my own.

Rooms and equipment have been provided for manual training and Household Arts. All pupils of twelve years and over are taking advantage of this work. The purpose of this experiment is to try to make the home atmosphere in this community more favorable to the continuance of the pupils in school.¹³

School fairs, embracing the activities of 3 or 4 schools in each case, have been successfully held in some communities. These fairs are proving themselves to be an important factor in developing "school spirit", in arousing general interest in educational work among the parents, and in suggesting to the minds of the rate payers the benefits which would accrue through consolidation.¹⁴

The rooms are well and expensively equipped for cooking. At Victoria and Strathcona there are sewing rooms as well as kitchens, well equipped for classes of twenty with cutting tables, machines, lockers, etc. All centres have one or two sewing machines in the kitchen for Grade VI work.¹⁵ (In connection with Household Arts, Calgary.)*

I was pleased to find during the past year more interest was taken in the social development of the student. The principals and the staffs were given encouragement and helpful direction to many student activities. The majority of principals realize that those who have the responsibility of organizing and managing a modern high school are compelled to accept the administration of social activities among students as a legitimate and regular function of the office.¹⁶

13. Ibid.

14. Report of Inspector C.O. Hicks, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1917", P.99.

15. "Annual Report", Department of Education, 1920", P.109.

16. Report of J.A. Smith, Inspector of High Schools. in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1922", P.90.

*Words in brackets are my own.

In a pioneer province the school district is oftentimes the only unit of social organization and the school house serves as the centre of the community. It is the business and duty of all those engaged in educational work to encourage this tendency and develop various types of social effort. Among these the school fair has become a recognized factor in achieving desirable results.¹⁷

I was pleased to find in the larger centres more interest taken in the social development of the student. The principals and staffs were given encouragement and helpful direction to many school activities.¹⁸

It is much better for these youths and maidens to spend a year or two on a farm or elsewhere getting some real contact with out-of-school life.¹⁹ (In criticizing the rapid pace with which young people go through high school.)

Many teachers are still found who believe that memorization of lists of facts is education. Little attempt to get pupils to think things out for themselves and take an active part in class discussions is made. The lecture method, the dictation of notes, and the use of printed notes is found to be all too common.²⁰

It is encouraging to note that there is a tendency among many teachers to break away from the old formal reproduction and memorization types of method, and make use of socialized study and problem methods, which encourage free and independent thinking. Some recent Normal graduates do this well.²¹

17. Report of Inspector Gaunt, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1922", P.90.
18. Report of Inspector J.A. Smith, Inspector of High Schools, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1923", P.23.
19. Report of E.W. Coffin, Principal, Calgary Normal School, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1923", P.42.
20. Report of Inspector C.H. Robinson, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1929", P.42.
21. Report of Inspector John Scoffield, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1929", P.43.

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21. Report of Inspector John Scoffield, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1929", P.43.

These excerpts show a trend towards an activity programme. Activities like gardening and school fairs are encouraged because of their pedagogical value and because of the school spirit that grows out of them. Formal instruction is discredited. Play is recognized as being necessary in the development of a wholesome personality in the pupils. The value of socialized activities is emphasized although the emphasis is focused largely on the high school. Finally, by 1929, definite statements in support of activity education are in evidence.

Thus far the desirability of introducing a more positive programme of education into Alberta schools had been pointed out by individual educators. It had not as yet become a general policy. By 1934 we note that such a general policy was beginning to take shape. Definite efforts were being made to draw up a new course of studies, based on activity. Again quotations from the various reports will best describe what was going on.

In his annual report (1934) the Deputy Minister, G. W. Gorman, wrote,

Education is not a means of livelihood---it is a means of life. Our objectives have possibly been based too much upon the need for obtaining a living. The result is that many who have failed to make a living may endure as well a mentally starved existence while the richest fields of their spiritual life are lying uncultivated. Mental attainments, subjects taught, and methods employed are means rather than ends. Greater stress must be laid on the cultivation

of personal and social character. The supreme motives in any system of education are character building and the employment of a full life.

Education is not a forced growth in the classroom period of childhood, but is rather a self-developing process, a living of life in wholesomeness and fullness, and the process is continuous and lifelong. This view of education does not aim at prematurely burdening the child with the tasks of manhood, but rather aims to develop at each stage the potentialities of that period. The aim of the school is to develop a habit of study and an inclination to practise it. This interest is the germ implanted by the school. Without this germ of potential interest, growth cannot take place. Education is thus not merely a matter of school years; it is a life process.²²

In keeping with this viewpoint committees were set to work to revise the entire school programme, for both elementary and secondary schools.

In 1935 the Supervisor of Schools, Dr. H.C. Newland, reported,

The new programme is built on the principle that education is a social experience in the course of which pupils plan, initiate, and carry out co-operative projects. The motivation of the pupils is strengthened and the classroom work is vitalized through a variety of activities, which replace the verbalism and repetitive book-learning procedure of the old course.²³

During the same year (1935) the Camrose Normal School carried on an experiment in activity teaching.

22. Report of the Deputy Minister, G. W. Gorman, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1934", P.13.

23. Report of the Supervisor of Schools, Dr. H.C. Newland, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1935", P.18.

The principal, Mr. Haverstock, reported the following results:

(a) There was a decided gain in interest, especially in the case of pupils sufficiently advanced in the skills to work along without constant oversight and direction. (Grade I and a proportion of Grade II pupils do not enter this category.) The enterprises provided motivation to a considerable degree---the more advanced the grade, the greater the motivation. To what extent the enthusiasm which marked the work in some rooms could be maintained over an extended period of time, only continual experiment could disclose.

(b) This method of instruction encourages many children to adopt the "student" attitude ---in the best sense of the word---and would undoubtedly cultivate initiative and resource. Evidence of this was observed. That this is uniformly true is doubtful. One problem which would have to be faced is that of how to treat the pupil who is by nature inclined to sit back and "let George do it".

(c) This method of instruction is much better suited to the intermediate than to the primary grades. The acquisition of certain skills---in reading particularly---is essential to its success. The general experience was that the presence of Grade I children did not benefit in proportion to the time spent; they needed the entire time of the teacher.

(d) A problem which presents itself in the graded school is that of numbers. Where these are large---which is usually the case---the teacher in organizing the work is faced with two alternatives: (1) there must be several large groups, or (2) there must be a number of small groups. In the first case, all pupils in a group cannot be usefully employed. In the second case, the difficulties encountered in keeping numerous groups actively occupied will tax the ingenuity of the most resourceful and well informed teacher. Others, not so capable, will be unable to meet the needs of the situation.²⁴

24. Report of G.K. Haverstock, Principal, Camrose Normal School, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1935", P.34.

The report then goes on to discuss the difficulty encountered in obtaining adequate equipment and sufficient and suitable reading material.

Activism Implemented in Alberta---Its Success

After such experimentation the new programme was implemented in 1936. It was a definite departure from previous courses of study. In the first place, it altered the system of grading. The first six grades of the elementary school became the first two divisions. Division I comprised Grades I, II and III, and Division II included Grades IV to VI. This new system of grading made possible a more convenient grouping of children for the socialized activities.

In the second place, the new programme was based on the 'enterprise' procedure. The Programme of Studies described the enterprise as

a definite undertaking; teacher and pupils agree upon it and tacitly promise to carry it through as agreed. An enterprise is an undertaking chosen, after consideration, for its interest and value; carefully planned in advance, carried out according to plan, and brought to a definite conclusion, after which some reckoning of gains is made.²⁵

The programme was in substance an activity programme. It was based on the theory that

25. Programme of Studies for the Elementary School, 1936, issued by the Alberta Department of Education, P.288.

learning is not something a child gets, but something that he does. The child grows into knowledge, skill, appreciation and culture; he does not take these things from the hand of the teacher.²⁶

Activities were to be the basis of learning which were intended to "socialize the individual child's experience, offering him a way to make his personal contribution to the efforts of the group.....entice the child to enquiry and understanding"²⁷.

A noteworthy aspect of the 1936 programme is that the enterprises were largely suggestive and urged upon the teacher, rather than prescriptive or mandatory. No outline was given for Social Activities in Division I, and it was "suggested that five or six enterprises form a year's work in Division I"²⁸, but urged that "every teacher of this division should attempt one or two enterprises at least"²⁹.

Another significant aspect of the new programme of studies is that several enterprises were outlined for both Division I and II. The teacher could choose any from the list. In Division II teachers were "urged to undertake at least two of the enterprises suggested"³⁰.

26. Ibid., P.3.

27. Ibid., P.4.

28. Ibid., P.267.

29. Ibid., P.5.

30. Ibid., P.290.

In addition to the outlines for enterprises there were also outlines for Social Studies activities in Division II. Several units of work were outlined for each grade. There were also outlines of organized subject matter in Elementary Science and Health Education. All the outlines were suggestive and not prescriptive, however.

The degree of success attained through the new procedures is indicated in the various reports. In 1936 the Chief Inspector of Schools, reported,

Few teachers have used the enterprise procedure to a maximum extent, but the majority of teachers, probably 80%, are attempting to employ it for a part of their instruction. Some inspectors have directed their teachers to limit their endeavors to two enterprises for the year.³¹

The report goes on,

On the whole teachers have grasped the objectives of the enterprise method, although some have mistaken the means for the end and have allowed the pupils' activity to degenerate into pure mechanical exercises.

The enterprise technique is developing in the pupils a greater power to make abstractions and generalizations, to relate cause and effect and to do independent thinking.

There has been a definite improvement in language since the enterprise provides additional opportunities for use of both oral and written language.

The culminations of the activities, for the most part, do serve their true educational purpose. The danger seems to be present, however, that they will degenerate into the recitation of memorized

31. Report of the Chief Inspector of Schools, H.A. Fuller, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1936", P.52.

parts. They appear to have served a useful purpose in acquainting the parents with the work of the school. In many cases the teachers have taken the opportunity to invite parents to be present and to have them observe the type of activity which is being carried on.

Mature teachers and those of wide experience and broad scholarship do not find the reduction of textbooks a hardship. The immature and poorly equipped teacher, however, does find the reduction a hardship. He immediately endeavors to overcome the difficulty by providing himself with texts and manuals, since he finds their use a necessity.³²

Of the effectiveness of the enterprise procedure the report says,

The consensus of opinion is that the enterprise procedure is more effective in Division II than in Division I. Its use is limited in Grade I of Division I because the child has not yet learned to read and is unable to use the printed page as a form of activity or a source of information. Teachers find it comparatively easy to introduce the enterprise method in Grades II and III because they have already acquired an understanding of 'social activity' from their study of primary methods where the same principle of instruction has for a long time been generally followed.³³

The inspectors also reported favorably of the activity method. Inspector Lorne Good writes,

Generally in those schools following the Enterprise procedure the work is on a higher level than in the ordinary classroom. Reasoning, imagination and self-reliance are being developed in the pupils. Only in isolated instances has the work fallen to the low level of mere manual work and play.³⁴

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Report of Inspector Lorne Good, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1936", P.55.

Inspector Kostash noticed that there was a favorable response from the pupils to the new programme. "The general reaction of pupils to the new programme," he says, "is very encouraging. The interest in the work has been greatly increased. In some instances the pupils are very enthusiastic."³⁵

The progress of the activity programme in Alberta during the years 1937, 1938 and 1939 can be deduced from the reports of the Chief Inspector of Schools, Mr. E.L. Fuller, for each of the years. Fragments of the reports will serve the purpose here.

About 85% of the teachers used the enterprise procedure in some form. The method is utilized this year to a greater extent in the teaching of Social Studies than in any other subject.³⁶ (1937)

Some teachers have a tendency to use enterprise material that has been organized by some other person. Some of the reasons for a half-hearted attempt to adopt the method are the lack of suitable reference books and helps; the difficulty of group endeavor in schools of small enrolment with, in some cases, one pupil in a grade or even one pupil in a division. Prepared helps in enterprise work have proved an obstacle to efficiency, originality and teacher progress. These so-called aids may seem to provide the teacher with suggestions, but when the plans given in the manuals are slavishly followed, the very spirit of the enterprise work is lost and pupil activity is seriously impaired.³⁷ (1937)

Through experimentation and the use of reference materials the enterprise method has penetrated even as far as the Intermediate School in such

35. Report of Inspector H.A. Kostash, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1936", P.56.

36. Report of the Chief Inspector of Schools, E.L. Fuller, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1937", P.63.

37. Ibid.

subjects as General Science, Social Studies and Health. Properly directed, it could occupy as much as 80% of the work of Division II in all subjects except the skill subjects.³⁸ (1937)

The enterprise technique is now almost universal in the rural schools as well as in urban, and perhaps 60% of the teachers are successful in using it to good advantage in the integration and vitalization of the curricular activities of schools. Recent Normal School graduates and teachers who have taken special courses evince the best conception and appreciation of the aims and methods in the enterprise procedure. Beginning teachers who have not attempted to apply the enterprise technique have experienced considerable difficulty in the direction and control of pupil groups which is a fundamental condition to proper progress. Generally the enterprises attempted are those that have been outlined in Summer School courses, in school publications, or in the Programme of Studies.³⁹ (1938)

Some of the enterprises suffer from a lack of that intelligent directive influence, subtly and skilfully exerted by the teacher, that is so necessary if the enterprise is to possess an organic unity and become an educative experience for the child rather than a mere pleasant time-filling activity.⁴⁰ (1938)

Many of the more mature teachers are beginning to appreciate and correctly interpret the present course of studies; they are enthusiastic and well pleased with the results.⁴¹ (1939)

These excerpts from the reports of the Chief Inspector of Schools would indicate that the activity programme became

38. Ibid.

39. Report of the Chief Inspector of Schools, E.I. Fuller, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1938", P.61.

40. Ibid.

41. Report of the Supervisor of Schools, H.C. Newland, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1939", P.17.

more and more widely accepted by the teachers between the years 1936 and 1939. The reports indicate, furthermore, that the pupils in general were enthusiastic about the new activities. Parents, who at first were skeptical and inclined to measure the success of the new programme in terms of their own school experience, also showed signs of becoming more and more convinced that the newer procedures were bringing results. In general it was felt that there could be still more integration, and that the teachers should work out their own enterprises rather than base their work on ready-made plans.

In March, 1940, the Department printed in a revised form its Programme of Studies for the Elementary School. In this revised edition a further step was taken towards complete integration of the Programme, with the result that the integrated part of the Programme now (1940)* includes History, Geography, Elementary Science, Health and Physical Education. Provision is still made for some formal instruction in Arithmetic (Number Work), Reading, Language, Music and Art; but this instruction is not to be scheduled for regular classes, being given only as the need arises in the course of classroom activities.⁴²

There was now no choice but to teach by the enterprise method. As the Annual Report of 1940 says,

The reprinted Programme of Studies for the Elementary Grades leaves the teacher no option but to include some activity instruction in the schoolroom. The lack of prepared

42. Report of the Supervisor of Schools, H.C. Newland, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1940", P.14.
*Figures in brackets my own.

outlines in the new programme has been the means of developing some originality and experimentation.⁴³

The new programme (1940) was thus built more completely on activistic principles than the 1936 course. No outlines were given for Social Studies, Health or Science, and there were no ready-made plans for enterprises. The revised course placed all the planning and organizing entirely in the hands of the teacher. A GRID was included on which the enterprises were to be based. Lists of suggested activities were given, but no outlines. A more thorough integration of material was urged upon the teacher.

Although the 1936 course gave great stress to the social element in education, the newer 1940 course emphasized it even more emphatically. The course explains,

Children entering school leave the smaller social group of the family for the larger group of the school. They must learn to adjust socially to others in this group, to live together harmoniously, to co-operate; in general, to be acceptable to the group, not only by positive means, but by checking unpopular propensities to be rough, inconsiderate, selfish, loud-voiced, or mean. They must learn to use liberty and to respect authority; to be helpful and dependable; to lead, to follow, and to participate in the varied activities with which they are associated.⁴⁴

The 1940 course takes into consideration the

43. Report of the Chief Inspector of Schools, E.L. Fuller, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1940", P.63.
44. Programme of Studies for the Elementary School, issued by the Department of Education, 1940, P.5.

"organismic nature of child growth and development"⁴⁵.

In fact, acknowledgment is made that it is based on the theories of reformers which were dealt with in the foregoing chapters. Under the title, "Guiding Principles of the Programme", we read:

The present tendencies of elementary education today, in Alberta and elsewhere, tendencies toward educational experiences that serve the child rather than the formal subject, all stem from the revolt of a coterie of European educational philosophers and practitioners, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel, to mention the best known names, against the formalism, rigidity, narrowness and inhumanity of the common schools of their day.....These ideas have taken root and borne fruit very slowly. Pestalozzi conducted his first school during the time of the American Revolutionary War. Here and there they established themselves in one or more forms, in the kindergarten movement, in the schools of Montessori, DeCrolly and Susan Isaacs, under Dewey at Chicago, and during the present century on this continent and elsewhere in an increasingly large number of schools and school systems.....Collectively these ideas and attitudes and the educational practices which have issued from them are referred to as the Activity Movement.⁴⁶

The 1940 Programme of Studies gave the teacher the utmost freedom in selecting activities suitable to the needs and in harmony with the environment of her class. The 'Grid' could be interpreted very flexibly. Either a progressional or an expansional procedure could be followed. No outlines of subject matter were given on

45. Ibid., P.21.

46. Ibid., P.22.

the assumption that "outlines of subject content in logical detail tend to hamper rather than further the integration process"⁴⁷. No attempt was made to

prescribe certain enterprises to be carried out by the pupils or to indicate either the number of activities to be attempted during the school year or the time to be devoted to a specific problem⁴⁸.

Obviously there was no aim for uniformity.

Subject matter connected with the activities was implicit. There were no outlines of requirements. The 1940 programme remained in effect until 1947 without revision. In 1943, however, it was considered advisable to draw attention to certain minimum essentials that should result from the activities. In that year the Department of Education issued a "Supplementary Bulletin on the Programme of Studies for the Elementary School with Directions to Teachers and Statement of Minimum Essentials". In this bulletin it was pointed out that

there is nothing in the Alberta Programme that condones sloppy learning, that prohibits a teacher from insisting that pupils shall require thoroughly and competently certain basic skills and knowledges⁴⁹.

In addition to the 'minimum essentials' listed in other fields (such as Arithmetic, Music, and Language) some of those listed under "General Information" might be quoted

47. Ibid., P.57.

48. Ibid., P.53.

49. Supplementary Bulletin on the Programme of Studies for the Elementary School: Department of Education, 1943, P.4.

here:

The pupil should have learned through the enterprise, the current daily discussions and direct teaching certain facts which are the common property of any well-informed citizen. These facts he will encounter during the varied experiences of his fourth, fifth and sixth years in school, as well as in his home and community. Such information will include:

1. The names of men and women prominently associated with the growth of the community, province and nation; and the names and achievements of outstanding scientists, inventors, explorers, artists and musicians. (See Programme of Studies, pages 62-159.)
2. The salient natural and climatic features of his community, province and country; the location of important industrial and commercial centres, provinces, waterways, and communication arteries; how men made their living in this country and in any foreign country which has been studied; the names of the provinces or countries from which some important industrial and food products are obtained; the names and locations of the continents, oceans and countries mentioned frequently in current events.

During each of the three years in Division II the pupils will do one enterprise dealing with Alberta, and one with Canada or other Provinces of Canada. The titles of the enterprises will vary each year and the emphasis may shift from natural resources, to scenery, to the war effort, to early settlers, etc., but each enterprise will involve the informational content it is desirable that each child shall acquire about his own province and country.⁵⁰

The list then goes on to include minimum essentials connected with Science. It will be noted that the latter paragraph makes the undertaking of certain definite enter-

prises mandatory. This emphasis on certain factual knowledge and the insistence on doing certain enterprises is somewhat of a deviation from rules of flexibility which pervades the 1950 Programme of Studies.

As mentioned in an earlier paragraph, the Programme of Studies for the Elementary School was again revised and put into effect in 1947. A series of four bulletins was issued in place of the one-volume course issued in 1940. The new 1947 programme did not abandon the principle of activity education as a quotation from the "Foreword" by the Deputy Minister, Dr. W. H. Swift, will indicate:

Though contained in new publications and styled in somewhat new form the programme is not a new one in the same degree that the 1936 programme was in relation to its predecessor. Rather it is an attempt to present in clearer and more useful form the same fundamental principles.

That there is more provision for uniformity and for mastery of certain subject matter is made clear in the lines which follow:

It is hoped that the material of the course, especially that relating to the enterprise instruction portion, can be more readily interpreted and followed by the busy teacher, by the teacher not too confident of his capacity to develop his own enterprise programme, and by the teacher handicapped by heavy enrolment and lack of facilities.⁵¹

51. Department of Education, "Programme of Studies for the Elementary School, Bulletin II, 1947", P.3.

The principles to be followed in the revision of the programme had already been foreshadowed in the 1946 Annual Report of the Department of Education. These principles were based on the general unanimity of the Inspector-Superintendents. Some of the principles were:

4. Sample outlines might be included (or printed separately) showing how enterprises could be initiated; methods of organization of material with suitable types of activities; as well as points where integration between social activity and skill subjects could easily be effected.

5. Bulletins and directives of simple form might be printed to help the teacher. This is especially true with regard to a study of our own Province.

6. The revision should be such that it will provide more definite direction to less competent teachers without sacrificing the flexibility of the present programme in the hands of the more efficient ones.

7. There is some feeling that the proper grouping for enterprise work in the elementary school is Grades I and II, Grades III and IV, and Grades V and VI.

8. There is general agreement that Canadian Geography and History along with stories of its heroes should be much more thoroughly, systematically and vividly presented than at present.⁵²

In the revised course a reversion to the patterning of enterprises is apparent. The Teachers' Service Bureau reports, in 1947:

A complete pattern of Enterprise Activities based on a Scope-and-Sequence arrangement is now presented for all elementary teachers. This revised pattern adds direction and guidance for the particular use of the less qualified teacher in such matters as key problems, suggestive types,

52. "Annual Report", Department of Education, 1946", P.26.

in the elementary grades. It should, however, be remembered that major modifications of the course should be attempted only after some advisement and with the permission of the superintendent of schools.⁵⁶

Thus the 1947 course is not meant to be interpreted as a rigid pattern of studies. On the other hand there are more defined boundaries than were outlined in the 1940 course. Provision is made for the prevention of overlapping and omissions, and also for continuity. Adherence to the pattern and mastery of certain defined bodies of subject matter is expected. Again selected quotations will help to clarify the position taken in the newer course:

This programme accordingly undertakes to present a specific pattern of Enterprise experiences for the guidance of Alberta teachers.⁵⁷

It is expected that, for the majority of elementary teachers, the directions of this programme shall be considered as fairly definitive.⁵⁸

There is no condonation in this programme for inaccurate and incomplete coverage of the basic knowledge concerning topics on which enterprises have been attempted.⁵⁹

That the spirit of activity is undiminished in the newer 1947 programme is apparent from the 'Scope' of the

56. Ibid., P.16

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., P.15.

core concepts and optimum numbers of Enterprise efforts at each grade level.

The concept of human relationships is presented as the dominant need for modern society, and information and understandings are cultivated that should add materially to the growth of democratic citizenship.⁵³

The 1947 Programme of Studies is not intended to be a rigid outline of subject matter and procedure. Leeway is extended to teachers to deviate from the pattern given in the course. The deviations are permissible within certain boundaries. In larger areas deviations may be made with the consent of the superintendent. A few quotations will indicate the spirit of the new programme:

Teachers and classes are then at liberty to choose freely within these rather generous boundaries and to add desirable areas of their own selection as they move within the minimum requirements.⁵⁴

These specific social situations are intended to be suggestive topics for Enterprises of units of work. The final choice is left to the teacher and the class.⁵⁵

Any teacher whose experience in handling Enterprise work has been highly encouraging should feel completely free to deviate in part or in whole from this programme, or to modify it in whatever respects may seem advisable in the light of past experience and local conditions. Any school where the staff has worked as a unit in attacking problems of curriculum adjustment in terms of local needs and resources should be encouraged to continue all feasible experimentation

53. "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1947", P.54.

54. Programme of Studies for the Elementary School, Bulletin II, 1947, P.28.

55. Ibid., P.18.

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56. Ibid., P.16

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., P.15.

course. The 1940 course had been based on nine "Themes of Social Living"---Food, Clothing, Shelter, and so on. The 1947 course is based on ten basic "social problems" or "major community activities"---Getting and Preparing Food, Providing Shelter, Providing Clothing, and so on. Thus "each theme has been converted to a corresponding problem". The inert "themes" become problems "requiring some activity for their solution"⁶⁰.

The "Sequence" topics follow from, and arise out of, the basic Scope problems. They are sub-topics, so to speak. They are not sub-topics in a narrow sense, however. A particular Sequence topic might have roots reaching into several basic Scope problems. The Sequence topic, "How Our Community Lives",⁶¹ for example, might be based on all ten of the Scope problems. The entire pattern is not too dissimilar to the Grid of the 1940 programme. The outlines of the Enterprises and the continuity prescribed, however, are deviations of the 1947 course over its 1940 predecessor.

Enterprises are outlined for the entire elementary school. While a certain degree of leeway is given with regard to the order in which the material is to be covered and with the titles under which it is covered, certain

60. Ibid., P.21

61. Ibid., P.40

"Major Learnings", which are expected to result from the study of each topic, are listed in detail. As an example, some of the outcomes expected to result from the topic "How Canadians Established Themselves from Sea to Sea"⁶² are listed below:

Social Studies

1. Early explorers were looking for a water route to China.
2. Canada's first explorers and settlers were French.
3. The early homes were built along river banks.
4. The fur-trade "paid" for Canadian exploration.
(Ten altogether).*

Health

1. Spices were once a very important part of diet.
2. Scurvy is caused by lack of balanced diet.
3. Vitamins are vital to health.
4. Contamination of water results from "civilized" wastes.
(Ten altogether).*

Science

1. The stars served as navigation points for early settlers.
2. The sun was an important aid to travellers.
3. Sea fog and storms are caused by warm air meeting cold air.
4. Modern sailors employ many safety devices.⁶³
(Ten altogether).*

The 1940 course does not portray a consciousness of subject matter such as is indicated above. It was expected that subject content would be covered naturally through the activities themselves and that the activities would dictate the subject matter to be covered. No attempt was

63. Ibid., pp. 65-66.

*Words in brackets my own.

made to give pointed directions as to what material should be covered. The choice was left to the teacher and the class almost entirely.

To round out the activities teachers are encouraged to include certain "parallel activities" which are relevant to and can readily be integrated in the major topic undertaken by the class. These activities might arise out of any of the ten basic problems.

It should also be pointed out that there has been some change of policy with regard to the grouping of children for the various activities. The 1946 Annual Report of the Department of Education had indicated that the grouping of Grades I and II, III and IV, and V and VI is more satisfactory than the placing of all children in the first three grades in one group, and Grades IV, V, and VI in another.⁶⁴ This suggestion has been largely accepted and applied to the 1947 programme. It is not made mandatory and provision has been made for the grouping of each grade as a group unit, or of grouping the first two and each succeeding two grades as separate groups or of considering an entire division as a homogeneous group, depending on the particular situation. A large measure of flexibility is apparent in this respect. It is significant, however, that much more emphasis is placed on the

64. Supra., P.167.

"grade" than had been customary since the 1936 programme went into effect.

The Alberta Programme of Studies for the Elementary School was again rewritten and published in 1949. The 1949 revision was only "devoted to the correction of the imperfections of the 1947 publication"⁶⁵, and no major changes were made. 'Learning by Doing' is thus a cardinal principle in Alberta schools at present. The "Foreword" to the "Second Edition" (1949) says that the new enterprise programme "is organized on essentially the same fundamental principles as were introduced in the 1936 programme"⁶⁶. In the matter of outlines and lists of 'essentials' there is perhaps more similarity between the 1936 programme and the new 1947-49 course than there is between the new course and the 1950 publication. The 1940 edition placed more of the responsibility connected with the choice of enterprises and subject matter in the hands of the teacher and the class than does the 1947-49 programme. Activity education is still very much in vogue but the boundaries within which the activities are to take place have been more clearly defined.

65. Programme of Studies for the Elementary School, Bulletin II 1949, P.3.

66. Ibid.

Activism in the Intermediate and High Schools

This chapter has thus far traced the development of activity education in Alberta mainly in connection with the elementary school. It is in the elementary school where activism has been implemented to the greatest extent, but the principles of "learning by doing" have also infiltrated into the Intermediate and High Schools. Since the general application of activism to education in Alberta is indicated largely by its infusion into elementary education, a brief treatment of its application to the Intermediate and High Schools in Alberta will suffice.

When the revision of courses of study for Alberta schools was undertaken in 1934 the proposed change was not confined to any particular level. It was to be applied to the entire school system, elementary, intermediate and secondary. The changes included a greater measure of integration (for example, Social Studies took the place of History, Geography and Civics), the introduction of more activistic and vitalized procedures, and the regrouping of the classes on a 6-3-3 basis in place of the former 8-4 pattern. By 1938 the Programme of Studies had undergone complete revision at all levels of the Alberta School and had been also fully implemented at all levels.

In his report in 1937 the Supervisor of Schools gave an indication of the changes made in the Intermediate Programme. He wrote:

Like the Elementary School Programme, this one is also a great protest against formal methods of instruction and rigidly prescribed lesson material. The course outlines are suggestive, not prescriptive. Teachers will select from these activities according to the needs of the particular class or group being taught. The time-schedule is specifically designed to prevent overloading of the daily programme of instruction.⁶⁷

This has been the general policy in both the Intermediate and High Schools in Alberta. Activity has been brought into the school in the form of committee work, class discussion, open forums, pupil reports, and the like. As in connection with the elementary school, a few selected quotations will indicate the general policy adopted:

The basic principle of procedure in this course is that learning is an active process. The outline abounds in activities that call for pupil experimentation, individual research, and creative self-expression.⁶⁸

Committee work provides the very finest opportunity for individual contribution, group planning, group effort, and group accomplishment. Thus the committee provides practice ground for social co-operation.⁶⁹

Lecture and explanation will be required from the teacher; but the students themselves should

67. Report of Supervisor of Schools, Dr. H.C. Newland, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1937", P.18.

68. Programme of Studies for the Intermediate School, 1941, P.36.

69. Department of Education: "Social Studies in the Intermediate Grades", P.7.

have every opportunity to discover for themselves, and to express themselves. Class discussions, properly regulated, should be employed extensively. The emphasis should be on practice in interpreting and understanding facts, and not merely in collecting and memorizing them. However, the facts, and enough of them, must be obtained before they can be interpreted.⁷⁰

The class should be organized with a chairman and a secretary. Have new officers twice a month so that all members get practice. The Secretary keeps a record of committees, their duties, books loaned and progress from day to day.⁷¹

Social Studies projects may include excursions to places of historical interest, agricultural demonstrations, experimental farms, factories, public utility plants, court sittings, or public institutions.⁷²

There should be suggestions for a variety of classroom techniques and activities which may be used to attain specified objectives.⁷³

Techniques suggested should make adequate provision for pupil participation, contact with community resources, facilities for research, provision for extensive enrichment and creative effort, stimulation of good leadership, coordination with student activities, and correlation with other subject fields.⁷⁴

Thus the spirit of activity is expected to prevail in the Intermediate and High Schools no less than in the Elementary School. The "Enterprise" procedure has not

70. Programme of Studies for the High School, Bulletin II, 1946, P.6.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., P.7.

73. Department of Education: "Curriculum Guide for Alberta Secondary Schools, 1949", P.22.

74. Ibid.

been applied in Alberta Schools beyond the elementary level, however. The Chief Inspector of Schools (1947) gives an explanation:

The complete and formal enterprise, however, seems scarcely necessary to motivate the work of the Intermediate School level. Reference and research reading, and making of simple illustrations, charts and models can be accomplished quite effectively through the various projects and at the same time permit of a greater range of endeavor with more diversification and more consideration for the needs of the individual pupil than would be possible under the formal enterprise as carried on in Division II.⁷⁵

In harmony with this policy the Intermediate and High School Programmes were organized around a core of compulsory subjects---English, Social Studies, Health and Physical Education, Mathematics and General Science. Options such as Dramatics, Art and Music are offered to round out the course. In a number of courses the studies center around problems. Various activities are carried on in connection with each problem. The problems are defined in the Programme of Studies and are mandatory. Uniformity is thus achieved.

Revisions and changes are being made from time to time in the programmes of study. Fundamentally, however, the courses remain much the same. A major change

75. Report of the Chief Inspector of Schools, Mr.E.L.Fuller, in "Annual Report of the Department of Education, 1937", P.63.

is being made at present in the Intermediate Program of Studies. The "core curriculum" has been modified and has become a "block program".

A block is defined as a large section of the daily schedule under the charge of one teacher and covering two or more subject areas. Such an arrangement serves two chief purposes. First, it enables the teacher to become better acquainted with the students he teaches since he has a smaller number under his charge, and second, it provides for close correlation between two major subjects and exerts a strong influence towards unifying the learning experiences of the students. Mathematics-Science and Social Studies-Language will be the usual blocks.⁷⁶

Thus the different bodies of knowledge are to be brought into an even closer relationship than they were in the earlier programme. "The unit method is to be used where practicable throughout the entire program"²⁷, making possible a wider range of activities.

Classroom procedures are to be organized on the basis that learning is an active rather than a passive process; group methods are to be fully utilized and the classroom is to be looked upon as a laboratory for democratic living; extra-class activities and school-administration are to exemplify democratic principles and to provide opportunities for active participation by the students in planning and management in accordance with their ability to accept responsibility.⁷⁸

Thus the adherence to a programme of activity for the Junior High School has been reasserted in 1950. There

76. Department of Education: "Interim Handbook for the Junior High School, 1950", P.8.

77. Ibid., P.7.

78. Ibid.

is no indication that there is any departure from such a policy with regard to the Senior High School. The spirit of activity now permeates the entire educational set-up in Alberta.

Summary

The evidence presented in this chapter points to a gradual trend towards activism between the years 1905 and 1934. Inspectors' Reports issued during these years indicate that many individual educators were activity-minded, at least to some degree. By 1929 approval of activity education had become more pronounced. Specific references were made to the "problem method"⁷⁹ and the "socialized study"⁸⁰.

In 1934 the concept of activity took a sudden spurt in its development. Statements like "education is a means of life"⁸¹ and "a self-developing process"⁸² were being used to introduce a proposed new programme of studies. The new programme, which appeared in 1936, was quite apparently built on the principles of Dewey. The enterprise system (problem method) became the outstanding feature of the new course. In 1940 a still more flexible programme of studies was issued. It gave teachers the

79. Supra., P.151.

80. Supra., P.151.

81. Supra., P.152.

82. Supra., P.153.

utmost leeway in adapting educational activities to the needs of the class. Alberta's activity programme had reached its peak in development.

By 1943 slight deviations from the earlier policy of flexibility had become evident. A bulletin issued in that year pointed out to teachers that mastery of certain factual knowledge was required. A list of such 'General Information' was printed in the bulletin.

The 1947 Programme of Studies showed a more marked tendency towards inflexibility. The principle of activity was still tenaciously adhered to, but the 1947 programme presented "a complete pattern of Enterprise Activities"⁸³, which means that the teacher and the class had to operate within more defined boundaries than they did between 1940 and 1947. The Alberta Programme of Studies was again rewritten in 1949, but no changes in policy were made at that time. Thus Alberta's schools are at present operating on the principle of 'learning by doing' but the 'doing' goes on within the 'pattern' set by the 1947 programme.

83. Supra., P.167.

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